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THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS: WHY DOES THE SUPREME
COURT FAVOR FREE EXPRESSION OVER
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?
Stephen M. Feldman;
Why does the Supreme Court favor free expression over religious
freedom? This judicial predilection appeared during an early spate
of First Amendment cases in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly those
involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and continues today. My purpose is to
situate and to explain the early cases in the context of a transforma-
tion of democracy-from republican to pluralist democracy--which
occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. Most briefly, republican de-
mocracy emphasized the virtuous pursuit of the common good, while
pluralist democracy emphasizes widespread participation by diverse
societal groups.
At the outset, a couple of caveats are in order. First, although I
emphasize the relations between democracy and the First Amend-
ment freedoms, I do not mean to suggest that democracy alone de-
termined the conceptions of either religious freedom or free expres-
sion. Many causal factors-political, legal, cultural, and otherwise-
influenced the developments of both democracy and the First
Amendment freedoms, and my narrative shall draw on these other
factors at appropriate points. Yet, the change in democracy-the
movement from republican to pluralist democracy-provides a lens
that fruitfully illuminates key elements of religious freedom, free ex-
pression, and their transformations. Second, while I focus on Su-
preme Court pronouncements, especially under pluralist democracy,
constitutional meaning does not emanate solely from the Court. Cer-
tainly, if one seeks to understand the meanings of religious freedom
and free expression, the Court is an important institution, but so are
Congress, the executive, and other governmental and non-
governmental bodies. Judicial decision-making at the level of the Su-
preme Court is merely one of many formal and informal mechanisms
that generate constitutional meaning. Thus, my narrative will occa-
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sionally discuss non-judicial actors and institutions. One cannot un-
derstand religious freedom in the nineteenth century, for instance,
without accounting for the de facto Protestantism then prevalent
throughout American society.'
With these caveats in place, a thesis emerges: the transition from
republican to pluralist democracy practically turned the First
Amendment concepts of free expression and religious freedom on
their heads (if free expression and religious freedom are understood
ecumenically, as not limited to Supreme Court pronouncements).2
Under republican democracy, constitutional theory and constitu-
tional politics often favored religion over expression, but once plural-
ist democracy emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, theory and politics
consistently favored expression over religion. Free expression be-
came a constitutional "lodestar"0 while the protection of religious
freedom became episodic.
Constitutional theory, in this Article, means the abstract descrip-
tion, explanation, and justification of the governmental system, in-
cluding an account of individual rights and liberties within that sys-
tem. Thus, a constitutional theory might, among other things,
explain the operation of democracy, the predominant conceptions of
religious freedom and free expression, and the role of the courts in
enforcing rights and liberties. Most constitutional theories contain
both descriptive and prescriptive components. Descriptively, consti-
tutional theories typically claim to be grounded on actual govern-
mental and societal practices, although most theories do not account
for the totality of such practices. For instance, a theory might assert
that all citizens are equal, but in reality, citizens might be separated
by gross disparities of wealth that generate inequalities of political
power. Prescriptively, then, constitutional theories generally include
a normative mandate so that actual practices, if inconsistent with the
I See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (focusing on
Protestant-Catholic relations in the nineteenth century).
2 The Supreme Court decided so few First Amendment cases during the nineteenth century
that it would be difficult to support a robust thesis about the Court's understanding of religious
freedom and free expression during that time period. Cf HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND
THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 308-18, 364-76 (5th ed. 1988)
(listing the Supreme Court's Free Exercise and Establishment-Clause decisions). When the
Court's decisions, however, are supplemented with evidence from other sources, including
statements from Supreme CourtJustices outside the judicial context, one can reach reasonable
conclusions regarding the meanings of the First Amendment freedoms during the era of repub-
lican democracy.
3 See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twen-
tieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1996) (noting that, in the twentieth century,
"the First Amendment and freedom of speech 'came of age,' that is, came to occupy the status
of constitutional and cultural lodestars").
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theory, should be altered to fit the theory. Constitutional politics,
meanwhile, refers to the political preferences or ideologies that in-
fluence the Supreme Court Justices' interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, including First Amendment freedoms, and that also shape
popular understandings of the Constitution. Political preferences or
ideologies are determined by numerous factors, including cultural
values, economic interests, and religious convictions.5
Part I of this Article explains the transition from republican to
pluralist democracy, while Part II examines how the Court, through a
series of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, struggled to explicate
pluralist democracy and its implications for judicial review. Part II
concludes by underscoring how the Justices consistently preferred
free expression over religious freedom in the Witnesses cases. Part III
focuses on constitutional theory and constitutional politics: how do
theory and politics in a pluralist democratic regime favor expression
over religion? Part IV, the conclusion, briefly explores how the Court
today still demonstrates a preference for free expression over reli-
gious freedom.
I. FROM REPUBLICAN TO PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
From the time of the Constitution's framing through the early
twentieth century, American governments were understood to be re-
publican democracies.6 The democratic element of republican de-
mocracy arose from popular sovereignty: government supposedly
rested upon the consent of the governed, so sovereignty ultimately
and always was grounded on the people.7 Citizens and governmental
officials were supposed to be imbued with civic virtue, which theo-
retically led them to pursue the common good rather than "private
4 For a related discussion that emphasizes the descriptive and prescriptive components of
most theories, see Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critica4 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893-94
(2000) [hereinafter Feldman, How to Be Critical].
5 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and
External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (2005) [hereinafter
Feldman, The Rule of Law] (discussing the relation between politics and legal doctrine in Su-
preme Court decision making).
6 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIc LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1409 (Ben Perley
Poore ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1877) [hereinafter 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS] ("That all political power is vested in and derived from the people only."); PA.
CONST. of 1776, art. V, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1541
("That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit....").
See, e.g., VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1908 ("That all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people....").
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and partial interests."8 Individual rights and liberties were of the ut-
most importance and were protected from undue governmental in-
terference, but, significantly, such rights and liberties always were
subordinate to the government's power to act for the common good. 9
Put in different words, any individual right or liberty could be sacri-
ficed for the benefit of the community.' °
The components of republican democracy facilitated the exclu-
sion of various societal groups from the American polity. For exam-
ple, while the framers of the national Constitution sought to con-
struct a republican democratic government, they acquiesced in the
severe state governmental restrictions on suffrage." At the time,
more than half of the population was barred from voting. Property
and wealth qualifications disqualified some white men, while women,
Native Americans, and slaves were typically excluded from voting
through the Civil War Era and afterwards." Such exclusions from the
polity-from "the people"-were justified in the name of republican
democratic principles: these societal groups were deemed insuffi-
ciently virtuous to understand or to contribute to the common good.
Thus, when large numbers of Roman Catholic immigrants began
8 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 59 (1969)
[hereinafter WOOD, CREATION]. The framers of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for ex-
ample, stated, "Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, pros-
perity and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one
man, family, or class of men...." MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. VII, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 958 (Ben Perley Poore ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Office 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter
1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
9 As James Kent explained, "private interests must be made subservient to the general in-
terests of the community." JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 (Fred B.
Rothman Publ'ns 1999) (1873).
10 See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (focusing on the antebellum nineteenth century and
how the distinction between the common good and partial and private interests limited gov-
ernmental power).
1 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 54 (2000) ("New Jersey's legislature took it upon itself to
declare that 'no person shall vote... unless such person be a free, white male citizen.").
12 See id. at 54-60 (discussing the disenfranchisement of those three groups); cf. ROGERS M.
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 170-73 (1997)
(chronicling the expansion of suffrage in the late nineteenth century); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 294 (Vintage Books 1993) (1991) [hereinafter
WOOD, RADICALISM] (explaining the reasoning for expanding suffrage to all white male Ameri-
can citizens). Keyssar writes, "By 1790, according to most estimates, roughly sixty to seventy
percent of adult white men (and very few others) could vote." KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 24.
Gordon Wood notes, however, that at least some Americans started arguing for universal suf-
frage during the Revolutionary era. WOOD, CREATION, supra note 8, at 182-83. By 1825, all but
three states-Rhode Island, Virginia, and Louisiana-had eliminated property and wealth re-
strictions for white male citizens. See WOOD, RADICALISM, supra, at 294. Keyssar reports that,
during the early nineteenth century, an increasing number of states barred free African Ameri-
cans from voting. KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 55-57.
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coming to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, Protes-
tant nativists were quick to condemn the immigrants as "unfit for citi-
zenship." 3  Catholics, the nativists charged, lacked the civic virtue
necessary for participation in American republican institutions. 4  In
the 1830s, Samuel Morse tersely explained, "'Protestantism favors
Republicanism,' whereas 'Popery' supports 'Monarchical power. ' ' ' '
Regardless of the exclusionary propensities of republican democ-
racy, its basic parameters-the emphases on popular sovereignty, vir-
tue, and the common good-proved remarkably resilient, lasting into
the early twentieth century. Yet, the specific understandings of these
concepts changed considerably during the nineteenth century. For
instance, many framers believed that virtue was concentrated in an
elite segment of American society. By the early decades of the nine-
teenth century, however, a growing number of Americans began to
believe that virtue was shared equally by all common people (particu-
larly by white Protestant men).' Similarly, from the Revolution until
the 1820s, political parties were deemed inconsistent with republican
democratic government. Political parties were viewed as factional in-
terest groups that corruptly pursued private and partial interests
rather than the common good. Partly for that reason, Thomas Jeffer-
son and his supporters truly believed at the end of the eighteenth
century that the energetic Alexander Hamilton sought to lead a po-
litical party and to create a national army for the purpose of over-
throwing republican government. 7 Yet, by the 1820s and 1830s, po-
litical parties became accepted institutions in republican democracy;
they were increasingly understood to be useful means for engender-
ing political participation by the common man."'
1 JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATviSM, 1860-1925, at
6 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2002) (1995).
14 Id. (emphasizing how Protestants viewed Catholic traditions as contrary to American lib-
erty); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 234-40 (discussing the relationship between politics
and religion).
15 SMITH, supra note 12, at 209 (quoting Samuel Morse) (emphasis omitted).
16 The republican lawyer and theorist, Tunis Wortman, explained that tnth "is not a court-
ier whose residence is confined to palaces, nor is it always to be found in the solemn gravity of a
deliberative assembly.... [Truth] is to be discovered and ascertained by judgment; and judg-
ment is a faculty possessed in common by mankind." TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE
CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 49 (De Capo Press 1970)
(1800). See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1962)
(discussing the development of anti-elitism in American society); SMITH, supra note 12, at 201
(discussing the "anti-elitist rhetoric" of theJackson years).
17 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 596-617 (1993) (chroni-
cling Hamilton's role in late eighteenth century political and military affairs).
is See, e.g., EDWARD PESSEN,JACKSONAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY AND POLITICS 211-
41 (Univ. of Illinois Press 1985) (1969) (describing the emergence of national political parties
during the Jacksonian Era); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER 171-74 (Eric Foner ed.,
Noonday Press 1990) (discussing the development of the Whig and Democrat parties during
Jackson's presidency).
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While the nation survived the Civil War, republican democracy
was subject to intense strains during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. These strains appeared in a variety of realms, in-
cluding the cultural, social, economic, and intellectual. For instance,
during the Antebellum Era, science and religion were typically un-
derstood to be harmonious, but after the Civil War, many academic
researchers in emergent universities aimed for a type of scientific ob-
jectivity divorced from religious beliefs.' 9 Before long, a religious
backlash crystallized, emphasizing a new type of fundamentalist Prot-
estantism. ° Meanwhile, industrialization in the growing northeastern
and midwestern cities generated tensions between those geographic
areas and more agrarian regions, produced wealth disparities previ-
ously unseen in the United States, and introduced dangerous and
mind-numbing factory jobs, as well as bureaucratic corporate organi-
zations.2 The manufacturers encouraged immigration so they would
have an endless supply of inexpensive laborers, but this massive im-
migration engendered cultural tensions, as millions of Eastern and
22Southern Europeans flooded into the country. These strains gener-
ated mass political movements, such as Populism and Progressivism,
which challenged republican democracy but ultimately left intact the
central republican concern for pursuing the common good.22
The conception of American government as a republican democ-
racy, under siege since the late nineteenth century, finally crumbled
in the 1920s and 1930s. Republican democratic governments, built
on agrarian economics, widespread land-ownership, and Protestant
values, no longer fit the urban, industrial, and culturally diverse
19 George M. Marsden writes that the "collapse of older theologies" led postbellum re-
searchers to display a "passion for order, systematizing, efficiency, scientific principle, [and]
personal discipline." GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 187 (1994). On the importance of
scientific authoritativeness and objectivity, see PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJECrMIY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 16, 31 (1988); DOROTHY
Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 62 (1991).
20 See SYDNEY E. AtLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 725-27 (1972)
(describing the drift toward fundamentalism); MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE
UNITED STATES: RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE 211-12 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the fundamentalist back-
lash). There are multiple other helpful books on the history of American Christianity. See gen-
erally JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1990);
NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY (1989).
21 See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 223, 231-33 (1955); WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA,
1886-1937, at 82-83 (1998); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1218-19 (1989).
22 See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 20-23 (1963).
23 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 21, at 259-61; ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK,
PROGRESSIVISM 54 (1983).
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America that consolidated between the World Wars.24 To be sure,
old-stock Americans continued to resist urban and immigrant intru-
sions. A surging nativist backlash (often with Progressive support)
produced Prohibition, a religious and cultural strike against Catho-
lics.25 Then, in 1924, the nativists managed to restrict immigration se-
verely.26 But with such successes, nativists became complacent, de-
flated by their own triumphs, while other forces further transformed
American society and culture. In the midst of 1920s' prosperity,
manufacturers realized that greater profits lay not in the oppression
of workers, but in the conversion of those workers into consumers.
With the help of the burgeoning mass media-movies, radio, and
print-a consumer culture took hold. Urban immigrants, just like
other Americans, were welcomed to spend their money on mass-
produced, mass-marketed products.
2 7
Eventually, in the political realm, conceptions of the republican
common good that had long reinforced traditional American Protes-
tant values were called into question. Emblematic of this change, the
Democrats nominated Al Smith, a Catholic New Yorker, as their
presidential candidate in 1928.28 Soon, the Great Depression acceler-
ated the transition in democracy. Whereas republican democracy
had assumed a distinct separation between a private sphere of eco-
nomic pursuits and a public sphere of governmental activity-
governmental intrusions into the private sphere were proscribed
24 See ANTHONYJ. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-1940, at 58 (1989)
(explaining divisions within American society during the Great Depression); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 332 (1963) (emphasizing the par-
ticipation of former political outsiders in the New Deal coalition); ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE
GREAT DEPRESSION 197-98 (1984) (discussing changing values in America during the Great
Depression).
25 Prohibition represented a cultural victory for "the old middle class in American society."
GUSFIELD, supra note 22, at 122. Gusfield explains that "[t]he power of the Protestant, rural
native American was greater than that of the Eastern upper classes, the Catholic and Jewish
immigrants, and the urbanized middle class." Id. at 123.
26 See E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMv4ERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-
1965, at 187-92 (1981) (describing legislative attempts to restrict immigration).
27 The rapid transformation of American culture and society in the early 1900's, and in par-
ticular in the 1920's are discussed in: GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY
COMMERCIALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA 20-41 (2000); LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN
TEMPER: AMERICAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE 1920s, at 56-97 (1995); WHO BUILT AMERICA?:
WORKING PEOPLE AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 270-87
(Stephen Brier ed., 1992). During the 1920s, "considerable headway was made-through ad-
vertising, installment purchase plans, a rising living standard, and a new emphasis on consumer-
ism-toward weaning workers from their traditional values and remolding them into acquisi-
tive, amoral individualists." MCELVAINE, supra note 24, at 202.
28 Cf SAMUEL LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 48-55 (3d ed. 1965) (describing
the increasing power of Democrats in urban areas during the 1930s). For an extensive statisti-
cal study of the 1928 election, see generally ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, PREJUDICE AND THE OLD
POLITICS: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1928 (1979).
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unless for the common good-demands for governmental interven-
tion in the capitalist marketplace became commonplace in the
1930s.29 Franklin Roosevelt successfully built his New Deal coalition
by responding to these calls for relief from economic deprivation. °
The coalition strengthened when unskilled immigrant workers, pre-
viously alienated from national politics, metamorphosed into voters,
largely through the avenue of the labor movement. While labor un-
ions had struggled before the 1930s, New Deal legislation helped un-
ions flourish; unions added members by the millions and, in turn,
mobilized workers as democratic participants (swelling support for
the New Deal).S Massive numbers of immigrants and their children
had now become part of the American polity)
2
The rise of totalitarian governments in Europe during the 1930s
helped to fortify the transition to pluralist democracy in the United
States. Fascists and Nazis authoritatively dictated to their populaces,
arbitrarily imposed punishments, and suppressed religious, racial,
and other minorities. In opposition, Americans stressed democracy,
the rule of law, including constitutional rights, and the protection of
minorities. These supposed components of American life and gov-
ernment separated us from them. Thus, for instance, in Martin v.
City of Struthers,3 decided during World War II, the Court struck down
the conviction of aJehovah's Witness under an ordinance proscribing
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 116-19 (1991) (emphasizing the
development of a more activist national government during the New Deal).
30 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 331-35 (describing the American people's trust in
Franklin Roosevelt). "By 1934, the pattern of the early New Deal was beginning to emerge. Its
distinguishing characteristic was the attempt to redress the imbalances of the old order by creat-
ing a new equilibrium in which a variety of groups and classes would be represented." Id. at 84.
31 See BADGER, sup-ra note 24, at 250 (describing the role of organized labor in securing the
loyalty of lower-income voters); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 147-51, 188-89, 239-41 (dis-
cussing the impact of unions in mobilizing the labor vote in a national campaign). Numerous
helpful sources provide insight into the labor movement during the New Deal. See generally
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY: THE LA FOLLETTE COMMITTEE AND THE NEW DEAL
(1966); MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA (1994); WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); KAREN ORREN,
BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1991).
32 See BADGER, supra note 24, at 248-49 (describing immigrants' support for Franklin Roose-
velt). "By 1936, Franklin Roosevelt had forged a new political coalition firmly based on the
masses in the great northern cities .... While old-stock Americans in the small towns clung to
the G.O.P., the newer ethnic groups in the cities swung to Roosevelt, mostly out of gratitude for
New Deal welfare measures, but partly out of delight with being granted 'recognition.'"
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 184.
35 For a contemporary emphasis on the differences between American and totalitarian gov-
ernments, see generally Clarence Dykstra, The Quest for Responsibility, 33 AM. POL. So. REV. 1
(1939). In 1940, Roosevelt said, "'The surge of events abroad has made some few doubters
among us ask: Is this the end of a story that has been told? Is the book of democracy now to be
closed and placed away upon the dusty shelves of time?'" LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 348.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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door-to-door distributions of written materials. In reasoning that
the application of this ordinance violated the First Amendment, Jus-
tice Black's majority opinion stressed that "[f]reedom to distribute
information... is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society
that.., it must be fully preserved."36 Justice Murphy's concurrence,
joined by Justices Douglas and Rutledge, accentuated the difference
between American and totalitarian governments: "Repression has no
place in this country. It is our proud achievement to have demon-
strated that unity and strength are best accomplished, not by en-
forced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the
fullest possible measure of freedom of conscience and thought.,
37
By the end of the 1930s, intellectuals were struggling to explain
and justify the new democracy that had emerged. 8 This pluralist de-
mocracy was, of course, still based on popular sovereignty-on the
consent of the governed-but now citizens supposedly were to pursue
their private interests. Politics was about building coalitions-interest
groups-and jostling for advantages in the political arena, compro-
mising when necessary to maximize the satisfaction of one's interests.
While the ultimate goal of republican democracy had been to achieve
the common good, the ultimate goal of pluralist democracy was to
participate, and to win (or at least to win as much as possible). In
theory, all groups and individuals were to participate, to express their
interests and values in the democratic marketplace. None were ex-
cluded merely because of their racial, religious, or ethnic status.3 9 In-
35 Id. at 149.
36 Id. at 146-47.
37 Id. at 150 (Murphy, J., concurring). Justice Murphy added, "In these days, free men have
no loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal
will not suffer but will prosper in its observance." Id. at 152; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (contrasting the United States with its "present totalitarian
enemies").
38 JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE GENEALOGY OF AN AMERICAN
VOCATION 105, 122-23, 127-45 (1993); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 112-14, 138 (1973). For instance, in his presidential address to the American Political
Science Association, Clarence Dykstra declared, "[a] paramount question which the world faces
is whether responsibility can be achieved and maintained through the democratic process."
Dykstra, supra note 33, at 22.
39 For contemporary accounts of (pluralist) democracy, see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (explaining democratic theory from a pluralist per-
spective); V.0. KEY,JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (5th ed. 1964) (emphasizing
politics as the exercise of power, and discussing the role played by pressure groups in that exer-
cise of power); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (outlining an extensive study of the functioning and influence of po-
litical interest groups). Dahl has explained:
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final
outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on
the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACYAND ITS CRITICS 109 (1989) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRACY].
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deed, whereas the Supreme Court itself before the 1930s almost
never even mentioned democracy, the Justices began to talk inces-
santly about democratic participation as they strove to delineate the
precise contours of the new pluralist democratic regime.
4
0
To be sure, the reality of pluralist democracy often did not match
the theory. The theory might demand full and equal democratic par-
ticipation, but the white Protestant mainstream nonetheless devel-
oped various mechanisms to thwart outsider participation, at least to
some extent, and thus maintain their own social and cultural domi-
nance. The long struggle, lasting into the 1960s, to overcome legally
protected racial discrimination, as embodied in Jim Crow laws, pro-
vides the most noteworthy example.4'
Moreover, those outsiders who managed to become full partici-
pants in the democratic system often did so at a price. In order to
participate, an individual typically needed to relinquish any strong
identification with or markings of their ethnic or religious back-
grounds. For instance, during the 1930s, many Jews managed to land
governmental jobs, but only if they did not appear to be distinctly
Jewish, according to dominant stereotypes.42
The transition to a pluralist democracy had numerous important
implications for American society and government. 4' For instance,
under republican democracy, lobbying was deemed a corrupt pursuit
of partial or private interests contrary to the common good. A legal
encyclopedia neatly summarized this general attitude toward lobby-
ing:
40 See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 56-57 (1993) (discussing the emerging importance of
democracy). John Ely, perhaps more than any other legal theorist, has elaborated the theoreti-
cal implications of pluralist democracy for judicial review. See generallyJOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980).
41 For detailed discussions of the Civil Rights Movement, see generally DAVID J. GARROW,
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (1986); ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1990).
42 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 224-32 (1976); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 213-14 (1997) [hereinafter
FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T]; see also ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE
PROMISED LAND 39 (1988) (emphasizing how Justice Felix Frankfurter minimized his Jewish
background to facilitate professional success).
43 In legal thought, the post-World War II "legal process" scholars built their jurisprudential
theories on the foundation of pluralist democracy. For a description of the emergence of the
legal process, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 115-28 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, AN INTEL,
LECrUAL VOYAGE]. For examples of legal process writings, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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Public policy requires that all legislators should act solely ... with an eye
single to the public interest, and the courts universally hold illegal all
contracts for services which involve.., the exercise of sinister or personal
influences upon the legislators to secure their votes in favor of a legisla-
tive act.44
Yet during the 1930s, with the onset of pluralist democracy, lobbying
by special interest groups became an accepted means of political par-
ticipation .45
Of great significance for the development of First Amendment
freedoms, the transition from republican to pluralist democracy dis-
rupted the institutional practices of judicial review, particularly in re-
lation to constitutional rights. As a general matter, under republican
democracy, courts had reviewed governmental actions by determin-
ing whether a disputed action was either for the common good-and
therefore permissible-or for partial and private interests-and
therefore impermissible.46 For instance, in an 1829 Tennessee Su-
preme Court case, Judge John Catron, who would eventually sit on
the United States Supreme Court, explained that "[t]he right to life,
liberty and property, of every individual, must stand or fall by the
same rule or law that governs every other member of the body poli-
tic."47 Thus, Judge Catron continued, "every partial or private law,
which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights... is
unconstitutional and void." 48 In 1851, ChiefJustice Lemuel Shaw of
Massachusetts elucidated the state police power by emphasizing that
individual rights, and especially the right to own property, must be
subordinated to legislative actions in pursuit of "the common good
and general welfare."
49
In short, the basic principles of republican democracy, particu-
larly the distinction between the common good and partial or private
interests, structured the practice ofjudicial review. Thus, when plu-
ralist democracy supplanted republican democracy, the structure or
framework for reviewing governmental actions collapsed; the purpose
44 15 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 969 (David S. Garland & Lucius
P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1900).
45 See DUMENIL, supra note 27, at 49-51 (recounting the various ambivalent views toward
"pressure groups" who sought and attained political influence).
46 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 51-55 (1993) (analyzing cases where courts ruled
to protect the common good); see also Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822) (noting
that, if a law is retrospective, it still may be upheld so long as it is conducive to the general
good); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 340 (Pa. 1825) (upholding a statute barring per-
sons living overseas for a period of time from claiming title or right of entry to Pennsylvania
land); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 621-23 (1831) (invalidating a Tennessee
statute denying bank debtors trials by juries because jury trials are part of the public good).
47 Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829).
48 Id.
49 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851).
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of judicial review blurred. Under pluralist democracy, the govern-
ment no longer was required to pursue the common good; rather,
citizens sought to pursue their private interests through various gov-
ernmental mechanisms, including legislation. How, then, were
courts to review the legitimacy-the constitutionality--of governmen-
tal actions?
In one realm at least, the answer to this conundrum was clear.
From 1937 onward, with pluralist democracy solidifying, courts were
to defer to legislative regulations of the economic marketplace. The
courts would, in effect, rubber stamp all reasonable economic regula-
tions rather than questioning whether the action was for the common
good.50 But Justice Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene Products
questioned whether such deference was appropriate when legislation
either infringed liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, including
free expression and religious freedom, restricted participation in
democratic 1Processes, or discriminated against "discrete and insular
minorities." Nonetheless, one might reasonably argue that the
Court has never articulated a framework for reviewing governmental
actions under pluralist democracy as theoretically elegant as the one
used under republican democracy, distinguishing the common good
from partial or private interests. I do not mean to suggest, however,
that the theoretical elegance of republican democratic judicial review
rendered it simple in application-it was not-nor do I suggest that
the Court refrained from exercising its power ofjudicial review under
pluralist democracy. 2 To the contrary, the Court has, in some con-
texts, continued to assert its power vigorously, including, at times, in
50 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) ("In dealing with the rela-
tion of employer and employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion ... ").
In cases of economic regulation:
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regula-
tory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced un-
constitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
5 Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. During Justice Stone's earlier career as the Dean
of Columbia Law School, he became renowned as a defender of the free-speech rights of fac-
ulty. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 838-39
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (summarizing Justice Stone's career).
52 With regard to the difficulty of resolving cases under a democratic republic's judicial re-
view, one need only remember the controversies of the Lochner era. See, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-65 (1905) (invalidating a state statute mandating a maximum number of
work hours per week for persons employed in bakeries). See generally BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)
(discussing the repudiation of Lochner era reasoning from a legal perspective); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE
OF ROOSEVELT (1995) (discussing the repudiation of Lochner era reasoning from a political per-
spective).
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the realm of First Amendment freedoms. Even so, within the plural-
ist democratic regime, the Court has struggled tojustify its exercise of
judicial power and to identify when specific governmental actions vio-
lated constitutional guarantees.
II. THEJEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CASES
During the 1930s and 1940s, the Court decided numerous cases
53involving Jehovah's Witnesses. These cases swirled around the un-
certainties of the blossoming pluralist democracy and its implications
for judicial review. The significance of pluralist democracy for First
Amendment freedoms, in particular, stood at the center of the
Court's flag-salute cases: Minersville School District v. Gobitis,54 and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.55 Gobitis, decided in 1940,
arose because the local school board in Minersville, Pennsylvania, re-
quired teachers and students to salute the flag each day and recite
the pledge of allegiance.56 The Gobitis children, aged ten and twelve,
"had been brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture
of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of Scripture. '
Since they refused to participate in the daily flag-salute ceremony, the
children were expelled. The Gobitis family argued that this penalty
violated the children's constitutional rights to both free exercise of
59religion and free expression.
The Court rejected both claims and upheld the expulsions. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion, reasoned that the best
means for maintaining democracy was to nurture a democratic cul-
ture. Democracy must be "ingrained in a people's habits and not en-
forced against popular policy by the coercion of adjudicated law."
6°
53 Helpful sources on the Jehovah's Witnesses and their judicial cases include the following:
PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 13-35 (1988); ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES: CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 28-
61 (1999); SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000); Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of
Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433, 433-76 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004); William
Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah's Witnesses in the Su-
preme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997 (1987).
310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
5 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
57 Id. at 592.
58 Id. at 591.
59 Gobitis actually was a misspelling of the family's name. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 53,
at 436 n.15 (stating that a clerk's error transformed the family's name from Gobitas). Barnette
was also a misspelling of the family name Barnett. Id.
60 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599.
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The Court therefore should generally defer to the results of the legis-
lative process-regardless of the substance of those results-"so long
as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and
unobstructed., 6'  Even if the Legislature had impinged on First
Amendment freedoms, the Court was to defer to the legislative judg-
ment unless the Justices identified some defect in the democratic
62process. Indeed, from Justice Frankfurter's viewpoint, the Court's
deference to democracy was likely to generate exactly those types of
political debates that would propagate democratic culture.6
Justice Stone's Gobitis dissent articulated a different relationship
between pluralist democracy and First Amendment freedoms. Justice
Stone initially noted that the suppression of minority rights no longer
should be justified by reference to the republican democratic com-
mon good, explaining:
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of per-
sonal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as they are here,
in the name of... the public good, and few which have not been di-
rected, as they are now, at politically helpless minorities.
But, of course, Justice Frankfurter had not relied on republican
democracy to reject the constitutional claims; to the contrary, Frank-
furter had elaborated the scope of judicial review under pluralist de-
mocracy. Thus, Justice Stone proceeded to critique the democracy-
reinforcing argument of Justice Frankfurter.65 In particular, Justice
Stone criticized Justice Frankfurter's assertion that the Court should
defer to "the legislative judgment 'as long as the remedial channels of
the democratic process remain open and unobstructed."' Justice
Stone, to be clear, did not object to the Court refusing to defer when
the democratic process is obstructed, but he believed that the Court
61 Id.
62 Cf ELY, supra note 40, at 73-104 (explaining the Court's role in policing the democratic
process).
63 Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Where all the effective means of inducing political changes are left free from interfer-
ence, education in the abandonment of foolish legislation is itself a training in liberty.
To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and be-
fore legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena,
serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
CA Id. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Id. at 602 ("But it is a long step, and one which I am unable to take, to the position that
government may, as a supposed educational measure and as a means of disciplining the young,
compel public affirmations which violate their religious conscience."). When John Ely articu-
lated his constitutional theory grounded in pluralist democracy, he called it "representation-
reinforcing." SeeELY, supra note 40, at 102.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 605-06 (Stone,J., dissenting).
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must do more to police democracy.67 Citing his Carolene Products
footnote four, Justice Stone added that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may tend to curtail the operation of political
processes" and, thus, should spur "a searching judicial inquiry into
the legislative judgment."68  To reinforce this conclusion, Justice
Stone reasoned that "freedom of mind and spirit," which would en-
compass free exvression and religious freedom, is prerequisite to
democracy itself. So, according to Justice Stone, "free government"
was the goal, but preservation of the First Amendment freedoms was
integral to achieving that goal.7 °
Spurred partly by the Court's Gobitis decision and partly by fears of
impending war, school boards across the nation quickly imposed flag-
salute requirements.7 ' More significant, innumerable vigilante attacks
were unleashed against Jehovah's Witnesses in retribution for their
supposed disloyalty, as evidenced by their refusal to salute the flag.
72
The Court announced the Gobitis decision on June 3, 1940, and by
June 20, the Department of Justice already had reports of literally
hundreds of such attacks.7 Perhaps in response to these events, the
Court soon reconsidered the flag-salute issue.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, another case in-
volving Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court overruled Gobitis and held that
a compulsory flag-salute violated the First Amendment. 4 The Barnette
opinions again revolved around the meaning of pluralist democracy
and its implications for free expression and religious freedom. Jus-
tice Jackson's majority opinion asserted that the point of the First
Amendment was to categorically withdraw free expression and reli-
gious freedom from the vagaries of pluralist democracy. Because
pluralist democracy is grounded on consent of the governed, the Bill
67 Ely identified the Court's role as "policing" the democratic or representative processes.
See ELY, supra note 40, at 102.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 606.
70 Id. at 606-07.
71 McAninch, supra note 53, at 1019.
72 PETERS, supra note 53, at 72-95; McAninch, supra note 53, at 1018-21.
73 McAninch, supra note 53, at 1019.
74 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Justice Jackson's draft
majority opinion referred to the vigilante attacks against Jehovah's Witnesses, butJustice Stone
convinced him to delete such references because they suggested that the Court was overruling
Gobitis for political reasons. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 53, at 451.
75 Justice Jackson wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
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of Rights precludes the government from coercing such consent.
7 6
Free government cannot exist without First Amendment freedoms.
This time Justice Frankfurter found himself in dissent. He reiter-
ated that his primary concern was to promote democracy: "The rea-
son why from the beginning even the narrowjudicial authority to nul-
lify legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye is that it serves to
prevent the full play of the democratic process."' And once again, he
stressed the need to promote democratic culture as the best means
for preserving democracy. The judicial enforcement of individual
rights was likely, in the end, to undermine democracy.
Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of thought and freedom of
speech much which should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional.
Reliance for the most precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be
found outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent
positive translation of the faith of a free society into the convictions and
habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against un-
abated temptations to fetter the human spirit."
During these early years of uncertainty, with the Justices debating
the contours of pluralist democracy and the parameters of judicial
review, the Court in effect experimented with different approaches
for resolving concrete First Amendment disputes. For a brief period,
the Court reasoned that certain constitutional rights, includini free
expression and religious freedom, were preferred freedoms.' As
such, the Justices explained, these rights deserved special judicial pro-
tection. In many cases, though, the Court treated constitutional
rights as values or interests that were to be balanced against other in-
terests, particularly governmental interests, within the pluralist de-
mocratic regime.8 0  "Decision as to the lawfulness of the conviction
76 See id. at 641 ("We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights
denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be con-
trolled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.").
77 Id. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 670-71.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (using preferred freedoms lan-
guage); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."); see also Howard Gillman, Preferred
Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,
47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 640-45 (1994) (discussing the rise of the preferred freedoms approach).
In addition, Chief Justice Stone had written previously in dissent, "The First Amendment is not
confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory
attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position." Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the demise of the pre-
ferred freedoms terminology, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
149-52 (2000).
80 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943) (discussing the need to
balance freedoms with other interests). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
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demands the weighing of two conflicting interests," the Court rea-
soned in Cantwell v. Connecticut.1 "The fundamental law declares the
interest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not
prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and opin-
ion be not abridged."82 But, the Court immediately added, "[t]he
state of Connecticut has an obvious interest in the preservation and
protection of peace and good order within her borders."83 Despite
such language, suggesting an evenhanded weighing of interests, the
Court would sometimes skew the balance against the government, es-
pecially if the invoked constitutional right was either free expression,
84religious freedom, or both. The Justices themselves acknowledged
their struggles to harmonize the judicial protection of constitutional
rights with pluralist democracy. Writing in Barnette, Justice Jackson
understatedly lamented, "[T]he task of translating the majestic gen-
eralities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of lib-
eral government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints
on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one
to disturb self-confidence.,
85
Significantly, while the Court's opinions often linked free expres-
sion and religious freedom-for instance, in the preferred freedoms
cases-the Court consistently showed greater solicitude for free ex-
pression than free exercise claims. This judicial favoring of expres-
sion over religion emerged most clearly in several of the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases. Members of the Witnesses often sought to fulfill
their religious obligations by disseminating information regarding re-
ligion through some inexpensive means, such as the distribution of
leaflets or books on street corners or door-to-door. Such individuals
were convicted for numerous criminal violations including breach of
816the peace and refusing to pay a license fee. Because of the nature of
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987) (exploring and criticizing the emergence of the
balancing test in constitutional law).
8 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Schneider v. NewJersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939) (striking down convictions
for distributing handbills by applying a balancing test that favored free expression). In some of
these cases, especially in the realm of free exercise, the Court would reason that the govern-
mental action could be upheld only if it was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
interest or purpose. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (discussing the ne-
cessity of a showing of a compelling state interest in order for states to limit First Amendment
rights).
85)W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
86 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1943) (discussing convictions of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses for violations of city ordinances related to fees for distribution of religious ma-
terials); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (discussing convictions for vio-
lation of New Hampshire statute related to use of "any offensive, derisive or annoying word" in
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their actions, these defendants would argue that both free expression
and free exercise shielded their actions from governmental punish-
ment. The Court, however, consistently refused to uphold the free
exercise claims in isolation. The Court would, on the one hand, find
the defendants' actions unprotected or would, on the other hand,
find the actions protected because of either free expression alone or
a combination of free expression and religious freedom.87 Without
the support of free expression, a religious freedom claim inevitably
failed.
The Justices demonstrated the distinct judicial treatment of free
expression and religious freedom claims in the two flag-salute cases.89
In Gobitis, Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion began by focusing on
religious freedom, "We must decide whether the requirement of par-
ticipation in such a ceremony, exacted from a child who refuses upon
sincere religious grounds, infringes without due process of law the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."" Indeed, refer-
ring to free exercise as a "precious right,"9' Justice Frankfurter articu-
lated a seemingly broad vision of religious freedom:
public); Cantwel4 310 U.S. at 300-01 (discussing convictions for violations of Connecticut stat-
utes related to breach of peace).
87 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down conviction by rely-
ing solely on free expression); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (refusing to recognize the religious
character of the defendant's action and then rejecting the free speech claim because of the
fighting words doctrine). Mazur explains:
Most of the decisions rendered by the Justices rely on the role and significance of the
First Amendment right to free speech alongside-but just as often rather than-the other
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. From the beginning, the religious
free exercise argument was less persuasive than the free speech argument. All of the
cases denied a full hearing by the Court from 1937 to 1940 relied solely on religious free
exercise grounds, whereas three of the five that received a full hearing during that same
period and that relied in part or wholly on free speech arguments were decided in favor
of the Witnesses.
MAZUR, supra note 53, at 50.
Cantwell is one case that might be interpreted as relying solely on free exercise, at least to
strike down a conviction on one of the counts. At one point, the Court writes:
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation
of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of
which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious
cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Consti-
tution.
Cantwel4 310 U.S. at 306-07. But throughout the opinion, and indeed in the quoted passage,
the discussion of religious freedom is consistently intermingled with references to free expres-
sion. While unclear, I tend to agree with Mazur's conclusion that the Court's decision "took
special note of the free speech arguments offered by the Witnesses, affirming their plausibility
as significant in the decision." MAZUR, supra note 53, at 50.
89 Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, overrulingMinersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
90 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 592-93.
91 Id. at 593.
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Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate
mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the
reach of law. Government may not interfere with organized or individual
expression of belief or disbelief. Propagation of belief--or even of disbe-
lief-in the supernatural is protected, whether in church or chapel,
mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meeting-house. Likewise the Consti-
tution assures generous immunity to the individual from imposition of
penalties for offending, in the course of his own religious activities, the
religious views of others, be they a minority or those who are dominant in
92
government.
Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter immediately qualified the indi-
vidual right to religious freedom by reasoning that it must be tem-
pered by a recognition of societal interests.5 Most important, Justice
Frankfurter explained, the right to free exercise does not relieve the
individual from obeying laws of general applicability. "The mere pos-
session of religious convictions which contradict the relevant con-
cerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the dis-
charge of political responsibilities. 94  In this case, then, the Court
concluded that the Gobitis children, despite their religious convic-
tions, should not be relieved from their obligation to participate in
the flag-salute ceremonies. Thus, only after emphasizing but ulti-
mately rejecting the free exercise claim, did Justice Frankfurter turn
to free speech. He quickly disposed of this claim by reasoning that a
societal interest in national unity outweighed the interest in free ex-
pression.95 The daily flag ceremonies, the school board had decided,
instilled in the school children the desired commitment to national
unity.
When the Court reconsidered the flag-salute issue in Barnette, the
Witnesses' attorney, like the attorneys in Gobitis, stressed religious
freedom. 96 Regardless, Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Barnette
92 Id.
93 See id. ("But the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of reli-
gious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow-men.").
94 Id. at 594-95.
95 Id. at 595.
96 See Brief for the Appellees, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No.
591), reprinted in 40 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39, 65-137 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); see
also Respondents' Brief, Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690), reprinted
in 37 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 367, 381-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); Blasi &
Shiffrin, supra note 53, at 437-38. Justice Jackson reasoned:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views or
the sincerity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' motive for en-
during the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share
these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the
individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt
from the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.
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relied almost exclusively on free expression. Justice Jackson men-
tioned the clear and present danger test and, somewhat obscurely, a
balancing approach as relevant to free-speech issues. 97 But in the
end, he apparently interpreted the First Amendment protection of
free expression as being absolute, at least in the circumstances of that
case: "[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.
' '98
To the Barnette Court, the flag salute was undoubtedly "a form of
utterance."99 Moreover, not only was the flag salute a type of expres-
sion, it was political expression. The government used the flag cere-
mony precisely "as a symbol of adherence to government as presendy
organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and
sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks."'00 But in
the United States, Justice Jackson emphasized, government was by the
consent of the people-a consent that the government itself could
not coerce. '°' Poignandy underscoring this point about the relation
between the government and political speech, the Court alluded to
contemporary world events: "Those who begin coercive elimination
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compul-
sory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the grave-
yard."
'10 2
Thus, the Barnette Court overruled Gobitis and held that a compul-
sory flag salute violated freedom of expression. But why did the Go-
bitis Court stress religious freedom when it rejected the First Amend-
ment claims, while the Barnette Court almost exclusively focused on
free expression when it repudiated forced flag salutes? More gener-
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35.
97 Justice Jackson explicitly referred to the clear and present danger test. Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 633. The reference to balancing is ambiguous:
The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The State asserts
power to condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profes-
sion and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child.
The latter stand on a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion
and personal attitude.
Id. at 630-31; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 29 (1970)
(discussing the different tests invoked inJustice Jackson's opinion).
98 Id. at 642.
99 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
too Id. at 633.
101 Id. at 641 ("We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights de-
nies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be con-
trolled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.").
102 Id.
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ally, why did the Justices consistently favor free expression over reli-
gious freedom claims?
III. FAVORING FREE EXPRESSION OVER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. Constitutional Theoiy
If anything, republican democracy seemed to favor religion (read:
Protestantism) over expression. As a general matter, courts would re-
view governmental actions within the regime of republican democ-
racy to determine whether the actions were for the common good or
for partial and private interests. Because individual rights and liber-
ties were generally subordinate to the common good, it followed that
the government possessed the power to punish speech or writing if
such punishment would further the common good.0 3 And criminal
punishment would presumably be for the common good if the
speech or writing had a bad tendency or likely pernicious conse-
quences. This theoretical justification for a narrow conception of
free expression elucidates the legal doctrine that prevailed in most
states through the nineteenth century. Free speech and a free press
were deemed crucial rights and liberties, yet individuals were respon-
sible for their abuses. Thus, in the context of criminal or seditious
libel prosecutions, the concern for the common good engendered
the truth-conditional doctrine, first articulated by Judge James Kent
in People v. Croswell.14 Under this approach, truth was a defense to a
charge of criminal libel, but only if the defendant published for good
motives and justifiable ends. If the published material was either
false, or true but with bad tendencies, then it was criminally punish-
able.1 °5 Given this theory and doctrine, courts generally were unpro-
tective of free expression under republican democracy.
In the realm of religion, however, the government-including the
courts-tended to be supportive. More precisely, the government
(the state and national governments, that is) nurtured mainstream
Protestantism but not other religions. 10 6 In republican democratic
103 James Wilson was one of the first constitutional theorists to justify the suppression of
speech and writing because of the principles of republican democracy. 2 THE WORKS OFJAMES
WILSON 279-80, 287, 313, 393-97 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896).
104 3Johns. Cas. 337, 375-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
105 For examples of free expression cases where the courts used the truth-conditional or bad
tendency terminology, see Moody v. State, 10 So. 670 (Ala. 1892); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4
Mass. (3 Tyng) 163 (1808); People v. Most, 27 N.E. 970 (N.Y. 1891); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3
Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 176 (1811).
106 The First Amendment religion clauses initially were, in a sense, jurisdictional: the na-
tional government would leave issues of religion to the state and local governments. The na-
tional government, in other words, would not interfere with freedom of conscience, and official
establishments would arise, if at all, only from sundry choices made at the local or state level-
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terms, Protestantism supposedly imbued citizens with virtue and
shaped their understanding of the common good. As George Wash-
ington declared in his Farewell Address, "religion and morality are in-
dispensable supports .... of the duties of men and citizens."' 7 Thus,
throughout the nineteenth century, leading jurists, such as Joseph
Story and James Kent, deemed Christianity to be part of the common
law. 08 Story, a Harvard law professor as well as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, considered himself a strong advocate for religious liberty.'09 Re-
gardless, in 1833, Story declared that "it is impossible for those, who
believe in the truth of Christianity, as a divine revelation, to doubt,
that it is the especial duty of government to foster, and encourage it
among all the citizens and subjects.". Even after the Civil War, when
many jurisprudents turned to a more positivist than natural law ori-
entation, Thomas Cooley explained, "[We are not] precluded from
recognizing... in the rules prescribed for the conduct of citizens,
the patent fact that the prevailing religion in the States is Chris-
tian.""1 Unsurprisingly, then, numerous states enforced the Christian
not at the national level. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 42, at 164-67; LEONARD W. LEVY,
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 66-67, 83-84, 108-09
(1986) [hereinafter LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE]. Given that the state governments (as
well as the national government) were conceptualized as republican democracies, the theoreti-
cal relation between religion and government therefore emerged most clearly at the state level.
107 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 169, 173 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963).
108 MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 31, 98-103 (1984); NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS
IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 55-56 (1992); FREDERIC COPLE
JAHER, A SCAPEGOAT IN THE NEW WILDERNESS: THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICA 139 (1994); cf PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 195-96 (1965) (ac-
knowledging that some jurists denied that Christianity was part of the common law); Stuart
Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 27 (1998) (question-
ing the significance of nineteenth century declarations that Christianity was part of the com-
mon law); B.H. Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-Believers in the
United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659 (1930) (tracing the notion that Christianity is part of the common
law to Lord Coke).
109 For a summary of Story's broader jurisprudential views, see FELDMAN, AN INTELLECTUAL
VOYAGE, supra note 43, at 81-82; Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Juris-
prudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1414-17 (1997).
110 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 723 (Fred
B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833); David Hoffman, a professor of law at the University of Mary-
land, wrote:
The purity and sublimity of the morals of the Bible have at no time been questioned; it is
the foundation of the common law of every christian nation. The christian religion is a
part of the law of the land, and, as such, should certainly receive no inconsiderable por-
tion of the lawyer's attention.
DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 65 (2d ed. 1846).
I THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 471 (Da Capo Press 1972)
(1868). Unlike premodern jurisprudents, such as Story, Cooley tended to equivocate more
about Christianity being part of the common law. Id. at 471-78. See FELDMAN, AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE, supra note 43, at 101-06.
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Sabbath of Sunday as common-law doctrine (and some states enacted
Blue Laws)." As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, po-
lice arrested tens of thousands of Jews for violating such laws.
' 3
Moreover, religious minorities, especially Jews, Catholics, and Mor-
mons, lived in many states with the threat that overt repudiation of
mainstream Protestantism might provoke a prosecution for blas-
phemy. A Delaware court, upholding a blasphemy conviction in
1837, explained that it had "been long perfectly settled by the com-
mon law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious
and wanton attack against the christian religion individually, for the
purpose of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indict-
able and punishable."
' 4
With the transition from republican to pluralist democracy in the
1920s and 1930s, however, this favoring of (Protestant) religion over
expression was reversed. In the first "explicit" free speech win in the
Supreme Court,"5 decided in 1931, the Court expressly grounded the
protection of expression on the operation of democracy: "The main-
tenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our consti-
tutional system."' 6 From this point forward, the Court not only be-
112 BORDEN, supra note 108, at 111-25.
113 COHEN, supra note 108, at 110-11; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN AW
587 (2d ed. 1985); IRVING HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS 362 (1976).
14 State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 555 (1837). According to a South Carolina court,
"[a]ll blasphemous publications, carrying upon their face that irreverent rejection of God and
his holy religion, which makes them dangerous to the community, have always been held to be
libels, and punishable at common law." City Council v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 508
(1848) (convicting a Jewish defendant for violating Sunday law). For additional cases where
prosecutions for blasphemy were approved, see Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20
Pick.) 206 (1838) (upholding a statute criminalizing blasphemy and the conviction of a news-
paper publisher); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 290 (N.Y. 1811) (upholding a blasphemy
conviction where the defendant "did... utter, in the presence and hearing of divers good and
christian people... 'Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore'"); Updegraph
v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824) (approving blasphemy statute but overturn-
ing indictment on technical grounds). Cf. Perry v. Perry, 1 Barb. Ch. 516 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (rea-
soning that the use of blasphemous language was probative of violent action); LEONARD W.
LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE
400-23 (1993) (discussing state court blasphemy cases from pre-Civil War America).
15 HARRY KALVENJR., A WORTHYTRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 167 (1988).
116 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). While the Stromberg Court linked free
expression with democracy-and it did so during the transitional period from republican to
pluralist democracy-the Court probably still conceptualized democracy in republican terms.
Indeed, earlier in the opinion, the Court had described free speech with standard republican
democratic rhetoric: "[t]he right [of free speech] is not an absolute one, and the State in the
exercise of its police power may punish the abuse of this freedom." Id. at 368. In an earlier
case that seemed to raise free speech issues, the Court upheld the defendant's claim to constitu-
tionally protected liberty, but the opinion focused exclusively on due process and did not dis-
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came more protective of free expression but also elaborated a theo-
retical rationale for broad protection based on pluralist democracy.
In 1937, the Court reiterated "the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in
order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.""' 7
The protection of free expression was "imperative" because it pro-
vided "the very foundation of constitutional government.""8 Pluralist
democracy, as the Justices would elaborate it, accepted diversity
rather than attempting to suppress it within the confines of a cultur-
ally homogeneous common good. Free expression, therefore, did
not need to be constrained to preserve "the existing order";1 9 the Jus-
tices had "no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually di-
verse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.' 2  By
the 1940s, the Court was emphasizing that "[t]he vitality of civil and
political institutions in our society depends on free discussion, " 2' and
that a strong conception of free expression was consequently a "fixed
star in our constitutional constellation."
12
In sum, if the hallmark of pluralist democracy is, as the Court rea-
soned, the full and open participation by diverse individuals and
groups in governmental processes, then free expression must be ex-
pansively protected. Political participation cannot be open to and
fair for all citizens unless each individual is theoretically able to ex-
press his or her interests and values in the democratic marketplace.
Such freedom of expression, it might be said, is prerequisite to the
operation of pluralist democracy. Not coincidentally, in 1948, Alex-
ander Meiklejohn definitively articulated the self-governance ration-
ale-the theoretical grounding of free expression on democracy.
2
3
cuss free expression. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (stating that a statute crimi-
nalizing speech, which advocated violence as a means of affecting political change, was an "arbi-
trary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the
liberty of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
117 Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
11 Id. As in Stromberg v. California, the DeJonge Court tied free expression to free government,
but the Court also used language resonating with republican democracy. DeJonge, 299 U.S. at
363 (reasoning that the Legislature could enact laws to punish the "abuse" of free expression).
The Court decided Dejonge approximately one month before President Roosevelt publicly an-
nounced his court-packing plan and almost three months before the West Coast Hotel decision,
which marked the beginning of the Court's 1937 switch (accepting pluralist democracy). See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
19 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
120 Id. at 641.
121 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
1 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
12 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-27,
45-46 (1948).
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"The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government," Meiklejohn wrote.1 4 "It is a de-
duction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall
be decided by universal suffrage." 25 And most constitutional scholars
still maintain that the demands of democratic self-governance require
an expansive core of protected political speech and writing and that
free expression is therefore a constitutional "lodestar. 1 26  One
scholar, for instance, recently proclaimed that "Iflhe heart of a free
society is the right-and in fact the duty--of the citizens to discuss
politics and to criticize the government."0
The theoretical ties between religious freedom and pluralist de-
mocracy have never been so distinct or compelling. While many
agree that free expression is integral to democracy-a right "essential
to the democratic process," 28 in Robert Dahl's words-many would
insist that the same is not true of religious freedom. Indeed, one
might reasonably argue that deep religious convictions are in tension
with a pluralist democratic regime. Pluralist democracy assumes that
citizens bring diverse preexisting interests and values to the democ-
ratic arena, that citizens jostle for advantage and try to win the de-
mocratic contests, and that-and here is the problem-citizens com-
promise when necessary.1 9  Under pluralist democracy, in other
words, citizens are theorized to have preexisting interests and values,
and those interests and values might be strongly held and pursued,
but citizens always must be capable of accommodating the interests
and values of others.5 Yet, some religious beliefs are not merely
strong, they are convictions-beliefs imbued with certitude, exclud-
ing doubt. For some individuals, such religious convictions cannot be
accommodated to other interests and values in the democratic arena.
One does not compromise, for instance, an absolute truth derived
from God's will. One does not compromise, for instance, one's pur-
124 Id. at 26.
125 Id. at 27. Meiklejohn tied free expression to a type of hybrid democracy. That is, he re-
tained much of the language of republican democracy, but he also repudiated its most basic
principle-that the government could infringe individual liberties, particularly free expression,
if necessary to promote the common good-and simultaneously accepted many pluralist de-
mocratic tenets. Id. at 6, 13, 90.
126 White, supra note 3, at 300-01.
127 Paul Finkelman, Speech, Press, and Democracy, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 813, 813 (2002).
128 DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 39, at 170. "Freedom of speech ... is necessary both for
effective participation and for enlightened understanding; so too are freedom of the press and
freedom of assembly." Id.
19 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 175-76 (1939) (discussing the importance
of negotiation in democratic processes). For the early pluralist democratic theorists,
"[c]ompromise, unreflective practicality, and slow social evolution were good," while all forms
of "moralistic absolutism" were bad. PURCELL, supra note 38, at 253.
132 See DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 39, at 260 (arguing that polyarchies or pluralist democ-
racies fail when distinctive subcultures cannot accommodate each other).
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suit of eternal salvation. Religious beliefs, from this standpoint, are
not readily harmonized with the processes of pluralist democracy.
Partly for this reason, some theorists have argued that religious be-
liefs should not be relied upon in political debates or, that is, in the
so-called public square. From this perspective, secular reasons should
be offered in any public debate because religious convictions are
likely to inhibit the free and open discussion and negotiation that
pluralist democracy demands. 3'
Nonetheless, some theorists have argued that religious freedom
should still be protected as fully as free expression in a pluralist de-
mocracy. For instance, one might argue that religious beliefs are so
central to the American people that any position that banishes relig-
ion from the public sphere inevitably blinks reality.' 32 For deeply reli-
gious Americans, secular reasons cannot possibly substitute for reli-
gious convictions; for these Americans, religious beliefs constitute the
core of their beings, their identities. Or, in the alternative, one might
theorize that religious freedom-at least for religious minorities-
should be vigorously protected because, in the words of Justice
Stone's footnote four, discrimination against "discrete and insular
minorities" should be impermissible in a pluralist democratic re-
gime. 3 Purposeful discrimination against a discrete and insular (re-
ligious) minority manifests a defect in the democratic process itself.'34
Or, yet again, one might theorize that the constitutional protection of
religious freedom proscribes the exclusion or diminished participa-
131 See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, in LAW
AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 69, 75 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (arguing for
limited use of religious arguments); Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW
AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 226, 230 (stating that law should be grounded
in premises available to all citizens and not citizens of a specific faith); William P. Marshall, The
Other Side of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 96, 99 (describing
religion as a fear of the unknown that leads to close-mindedness). Some theorists have also ad-
dressed whether judges should rely upon their religious beliefs when deciding cases. See, e.g.,
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 141-50 (1995) (supporting a
judge's use of religious convictions because they reflect shared societal approaches to the law).
132 See Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, in LAW AND RELIGION: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 131, at 89, 89 (citing the overwhelming majority of Americans
who identify themselves as Christian). Daniel 0. Conkle argues that fundamentalist religious
views should be excluded from public debates, but that other non-absolute religious beliefs
should be allowed. Daniel 0. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the
Search for Truth in Contemporary America, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 131, at 317, 317.
153 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
134 This theory, for all discrete and insular minorities rather than only for religious minori-
ties, has been most fully developed by John Ely. ELY, supra note 40, at 148-53 (describing the
provision as dynamic and open to interpretation).
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tion of religious groups qua religious groups within the American
polity.
135
In any event, while some theorists might be persuaded by any one
of these arguments (or, for that matter, by some other argument or
combination of arguments), no single theoretical justification for the
broad protection of religious freedom enjoys the near-universal sup-
port that is accorded to the self-governance rationale for free expres-
sion.136 To be sure, many free-speech theorists offer additional ra-
tionales for protecting expression, but most concede that, at a
minimum, political expression must be protected because it is inte-
gral to pluralist democracy.1 3 7 Many would agree that, without free
expression, "the democratic process does not exist"; 38 however, a
similar assertion for religious freedom would likely provoke wide-
spread dissent. In short, the importance of free expression to a plu-
ralist democratic regime is readily apparent, whereas the same is not
true of religious freedom.
B. Constitutional Politics
Theory is one thing, but its application is another. Whatever
theoretical outlooks the various Justices held, they implemented
those theories from within their respective political horizons. More-
over, the Justices' political views undoubtedly contributed to their
theoretical preferences in the first place.
139
Under republican democracy, the predominant legal doctrine for
determining the scope of free expression was the Croswell truth-
conditional standard. Published material was criminally punishable if
it was either false, or true but with bad tendencies.1 4  In those in-
stances in which an individual was being prosecuted, courts consis-
tently held that the defendant's expression was unprotected as either
false or likely to produce a bad tendency. After all, the mere fact that
the defendant was being prosecuted demonstrated that at least some
governmental actors believed the speech to be harmful or bad. For
instance, in an 1879 federal prosecution for mailing obscene materi-
135 See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REv. 543, 594-95 (1986) (reconciling the focus on rights in the Constitution with shared
community values implied by group consensus in political participation).
136 Even an avowed religious believer can acknowledge problems when religious beliefs are
invoked in the public sphere. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality,
in LAWAND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 131, at 115, 115-148.
1.7 Emerson summarizes three philosophical rationales in addition to self-governance: self-
fulfillment, search for truth, and societal stability. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 6-7.
38 DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 39, at 170.
139 For a discussion of the relation between politics and legal doctrine in Supreme Court de-
cision making, see Feldman, The Rule of Law, supra note 5.
140 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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als, a court approved a definition of obscenity based on bad tenden-
cies; material was deemed obscene "if it would have a tendency to
suggest impure and libidinous thoughts in the minds of those open
to the influence of such thoughts, and thus deprave and corrupt their
morals, if they should read such matter."04' Similarly, in the 1891 New
York prosecution People v. Most, the State convicted the defendant
under an unlawful assembly statute for making a threat in concert
with two other persons.43 In the context of a volatile political situa-
tion and in front of a sympathetic audience, Most had "denounced
the murderers of... 'friends and comrades' and threatened re-
venge.' ' 43 In upholding the conviction, the New York court reasoned
that the government could protect against expression with a bad ten-
dency. The court explained,
[n]or is it... an answer to the indictment that the threats related to acts
not presently to be done, but to be performed at some future time, when
affairs were ripe for the revolution predicted. The main purpose of the
common law and of the statute relating to unlawful assemblies is the pro-
tection of the public peace.144
Unsurprisingly, in the Supreme Court's first twentieth century free
expression cases, the Justices generally approved the bad tendency
approach as well.
145
Politics influenced free expression in another manner outside of
the courts' judicial interpretations of legal doctrine. In particular,
the bad tendency standard coexisted with two competing traditions:
a tradition of dissent and a tradition of suppression. Both of these
traditions not only had roots reaching back before the American
Revolution to colonial times, but both traditions also had been re-
peatedly manifested through official and unofficial channels. During
the Revolutionary era, for instance, American Patriots consistently
declared the importance of dissent in opposition to British rule and
law: "THERE is nothing so fretting and vexatious, nothing so justly
TERRIBLE to tyrants, and their tools and abettors, as a FREE PRESS,"
proclaimed Samuel Adams in the Boston Gazette.146 Yet, those same
American Patriots were quick to suppress the views of British Loyalists
or Tories who were scared into silence, driven out of town, or tarred
141 United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1103-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571).
142 People v. Most, 27 N.E. 970 (N.Y. 1891).
143 Id. at 972.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1919) (upholding a conviction
under the Espionage Act of 1917); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (applying the
bad tendency test); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1907)
(upholding a contempt conviction).
146 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 67 (1985) (quoting Samuel Adams,
BOSTON GAZETrE, Mar. 14, 1768).
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and feathered. 147 Significantly, the tradition of suppression as well as
the narrow nineteenth century legal definition of free expression fit
closely with the exclusionary component of republican democracy,
which supposedly justified the denial of individual rights to large
groups of the population, such as women and African Americans.
The suppression of speech and writing for individuals in these groups
was merely one aspect of their diminished liberty and participation in
the polity.
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, many dis-
putes involving free expression were centered in forums other than
the courts. Invocations of the traditions of dissent and suppression
were consequently more important than citations to legal authorities
and doctrine. In these years, the competing traditions repeatedly
clashed within the crucible of slavery and abolition. Slavery was the
political issue that drove nineteenth century actors, that forced one
confrontation after another, until the final confrontation of the Civil
War. 48 Hence, while Americans cared about free expression through
most of these antebellum conflicts, free expression was a rhetorical
tool to be used for political advantage. For example, in the mid-
1830s, the American Anti-Slavery Society initiated a petition drive and
flooded Congress with petitions signed by thousands of abolition-
ists. 149 In effect, the abolitionists sought to invoke the tradition of dis-
sent, of speaking one's mind, through the right of petition. Slave-
holders, however, were quick to seek suppression: Southern
congressional leaders managed to impose a gag-rule in the House
that barred the presentation of abolitionist petitions.
150
Turning to religion under republican democracy, the last official
state church establishment ended in 1833,15' but most Americans con-
tinued to understand religious freedom from a largely Protestant
point of view. In 1853, clergyman and professor Bela Bates Edwards
epitomized this perspective: "Perfect religious liberty does not imply
that government of the country is not a Christian government."
147 See WILBUR HENRY SIEBERT, THE LOYALISTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 19-21 (1972) (describing
treatment of Philadelphia Tories in 1775).
148 See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) (discussing free expres-
sion disputes from the antebellum period).
149 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 65-112 (1996).
150 Id. at 115-49.
151 See LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 106, at 38 (recounting how Massachu-
setts amended its state constitution to end public support of religion).
12 ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES
49 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting 1 BELA BATES EDWARDS, WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR B. B. EDWARDS 490
(Edwards A. Park ed., Boston, John P. Jewett & Co. 1853)); accord Philip Schaff, Church and
State in the United States (1888) (prepared for publication in the studies of the recently
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Alexis de Tocqueville had observed that "[i]n the United
States,. . . Christianity itself is an established and irresistible fact.'
53
In 1888, James Bryce likewise discerned that "Christianity is in fact
understood to be, though not the legally established religion, yet the
national religion.' 54  Unsurprisingly, many states explicitly limited
the civil rights of non-Christians, often long after the state-established
churches had been eliminated. In the early 1800s, for example, Jews
could practice law in only four states: Pennsylvania, Virginia, South
Carolina, and New York. 5 Through much of the nineteenth century,
numerous states restricted public office-holding so as to favor Protes-
tants, in particular, or Christians in general.
5
1
founded American Historical Association), rerinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 147 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 3d ed. 2003) (explaining the separa-
tion between Church and State in the American system while recognizing that Christianity is
understood to be, though not legally established as, the national religion).
153 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 6 (Phillips Bradley & Francis Bowen
eds., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1840). Tocqueville added that, in Amer-
ica, "from the beginning, politics and religion contracted an alliance which has never been dis-
solved"; American government and Protestantism thus flowed together "in one undivided cur-
rent." 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 300, 302 (Phillips Bradley & Francis
Bowen eds., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835). For that reason, Toc-
queville concluded, "there is no country in the world where the Christian religion retains a
greater influence over the souls of men than in America." 1 TOCQUEviLLE, supra, at 303.
154 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 698-704 (3d ed. 1894), reprinted in
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 152, at 150, 153. Bryce added that Ameri-
cans "deem the general acceptance of Christianity to be one of the main sources of their na-
tional prosperity and their nation a special object of the Divine favour." Id.
5 SeeJAHER, supra note 108, at 121 (listing restraints on rights by state).
56 See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXV, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 817, 820 (requiring "a declaration of a belief in the Christian
religion" to hold public office). A "Jew Bill" was incorporated in the Maryland Constitution of
1851. See MD. CONST. of 1851, art. XXXIV, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 837, 839 (appending to the oath of office clause with the re-
quirement that "if the party shall profess to be a Jew, the declaration shall be of his belief in a
future state of rewards and punishments"); 1 THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1840, A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 53 (Joseph L. Blau & Salo W. Baron eds., 1963) (reprinting the final
form of the "Jew Bill"). A similar provision favoring Protestants existed in the North Carolina
Constitution. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1409, 1413 ("[N]o person, who shall deny the being of God or
the truth of the Protestant religion ... shall be capable of holding any office ... within this
state"); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, § 2 (1835), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1415, 1418 (allowing all Christians to hold office); N.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. VI, § 5, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at
1419, 1430 (barring from office "all persons who shall deny the being of Almighty God"); see also
BORDEN, supra note 108, at 42-50 (discussing the political rights of Jews in North Carolina).
New Hampshire was the last state to eliminate its religious test or restriction on holding public
office. BORDEN, supra note 108, at 32; see N.H. CONST. of 1792, part II, § 14, § 29, § 42, reprinted
in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1294, 1298, 1299, 1301 (requiring
members of the state's House of Representatives, Senate, and the Governor to be "of the Protes-
tant religion"); N.H. CONST. of 1792 (1877), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1308, 1309 (striking the Protestant requirement). Frederic
CopleJaher writes:
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For approximately the first 150 years of the nation's existence, the
Supreme Court infrequently decided cases related to religion,
whether under the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, or
otherwise. When the occasional case involving religion reached the
Court, the Justices' legal pronouncements typically manifested the
Protestant nature of American culture and society. 5 In 1844, for in-
stance, the Court decided Vidal v. Girard's Executors.15 In Vidal, Girard
had bequeathed his sizable estate for the purpose of creating a school
for orphans and impoverished scholars. Girard's will, however, in-
cluded the following limitation: "[N]o ecclesiastic, missionary, or
minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station
or duty whatever in the said college; nor shall any such person ever
be admitted for any purpose... within the premises.., of the said
college.' 5 9 The will was challenged as being hostile to Christianity
and therefore contrary to the common law of Pennsylvania, where
Girard had resided. In upholding the validity of the will, the Court
acknowledged that "Christianity [is] a part of the common law of the
[S]tate [of Pennsylvania] ... [in the sense] that its divine origin and
truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and
openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers
or the injury of the public.' 6 0 The Court did not see any tension be-
tween, on the one hand, having the state common law encompass
Christianity and, on the other hand, having a state constitution that
included disestablishment and free exercise clauses. As if to under-
score even further how the hegemonic Protestant culture shaped the
American understanding of religious freedom, the Court turned to
an additional, though hypothetical, issue: whether a devise "for the
propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of infidelity"
would contravene the common law.16' In refusing to decide this issue,
since it was not raised by the facts, the Court nonetheless suggested
that such a devise might impugn or repudiate Christianity and thus
Between the 1780s and 1830s these restraints [on public office-holding] were eliminated
except in New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, and were ab-
sent from the fundamental charters of newly admitted states. From 1789 to 1792, for ex-
ample, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Georgia... enfranchised Jews.
JAHER, supra note 108, at 121.
157 One reason that few cases reached the Court was that it had held in 1845 that the religion
clauses did not apply whatsoever against the state governments. See Permoli v. Municipality No.
1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845) (leaving religious protections up to the states); see also Bar-
ron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does not apply against states).
158 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
159 Id. at 133.
160 Id. at 198.
161 Id.
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might be unenforceable. 62 Moreover, the Court added that "[s]uch a
case is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian country.,1
6 3
When the Court considered the rare religion case challenging
federal activity, most often brought under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Justices upheld the governmental action as constitutional. Put in
different words, the beliefs and practices of religious outsiders were
inevitably found subordinate to the common good of the mainstream
Protestant polity. In Reynolds v. United States, 1 decided in 1878, Rey-
nolds challenged his criminal conviction for committing polygamy in
a federal territory. 165 Reynolds, a Mormon, contended that he was re-
ligiously obligated to follow polygamy and that the conviction there-
fore violated the Free Exercise Clause. 66 The Court not only rejected
the First Amendment claim and upheld Reynolds' conviction, but in
doing so, the Court also closely followed Protestant doctrine. Protes-
tant denominations generally stress that salvation turns solely on faith
or belief in Christ, and is unrelated to this-worldly conduct or ac-
167tion. Predictably, then, the Court, too, emphasized a distinction
between beliefs and actions. According to the Court, Congress could
not constitutionally pass laws that would infringe on religious beliefs
and opinions-since such laws would interfere with Protestant salva-
tion-but Congress could restrict actions, for the good of society,
even if those actions were supposedly related to religious beliefs. 1'8
Nearly fifteen years later, the Justices considered a federal statute
that proscribed entering contracts with aliens that would encourage
their immigration.169 Despite this statutory prohibition, a church had
contracted for an English citizen to come to America as the church's
rector and pastor. In Holy Trinity Church v. United States, the Court
held that the federal statute did not prohibit this particular contract
because Congress could not have intended to prohibit contracting
with Christian ministers.170  After all, the Court reasoned, "this is a
162 Id. at 199.
163 Id. at 198.
164 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
165 Id. at 146.
166 Id. at 161-62.
167 FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 42, at 179-80 (emphasizing the Protestant need to
declare faith in Christ).
168 Id. at 165; see Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Ex-
erciseJurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
713 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of the distinction between belief and conduct in the
Court's free exercise cases); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) (upholding a re-
striction against polygamy, stating, "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civi-
lized and Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United States.").
1 See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
170 Id. at 472.
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Christian nation.'' Congressional intent was to prohibit the impor-
tation of cheap and unskilled laborers-many of whom were non-
Christians-because they were disrupting the American labor mar-
ket.7 2 The Court concluded with an incredulous rhetorical question:
"[S] hall it be believed that a Congress of the United States intended
to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for
the services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?"
73
As with free expression, of course, politics also shaped religious
freedom outside of judicial contexts and legal pronouncements.
Non-Protestants typically enjoyed far more liberty in the United
States than they had in their homelands. In this sense, there was a
popular tradition of religious dissent. Jews, for instance, left Eastern
Europe in droves partly because they faced government-sponsored
pogroms in their countries of origin.7 4 In the United States, they
rarely had to endure overt governmental suppression or violence.
This tradition of dissent, though, was perhaps most evident within
Protestantism itself. Because of the lack of state-sponsored churches,
Protestants readily switched from one church to another, and, with
amazing frequency created new Protestant sects and denominations
(especially during the Second Great Awakening of the nineteenth
century) .
But this tradition of dissent was counterbalanced by a vigorous
tradition of suppression. During the early nineteenth century, for in-
stance, the most prominent American Jew was Mordecai Noah, the
American consul to Tunis from 1813 to 1815. Newspapers belittled
Noah by referring to him with anti-semitic epithets like "Hooked
Nose" and "Shylock.' 7 6  Eventually, the Secretary of State, James
Monroe, dismissed Noah from his post because "the Religion which
you profess [is] an obstacle to the exercise of your consular func-
tions." 7 7 The tradition of suppression was manifested more violently
in the case of the Mormons. Joseph Smith, Jr., founded the Mormon
movement in upstate New York in the midst of the Second Great
Awakening. In the Book of Mormon, which Smith wrote, he incorpo-
rated the history of European colonization of America into Christian
eschatology; Mormonism, that is, was to supplant mainstream Christi-
anity, just as early Christianity had been intended to supplantJudaism
171 Id. at 471.
172 Id. at 463-71.
173 Id. at 471.
174 See PAULJOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THEJEWS 356-67 (1987) (explicating that the treatment
of Jews under Tsarist Russia was a particularly strong impetus).
175 See BUTLER, supra note 20, at 240; HATCH, supra note 20, at 9, 163-67.
176 JAHER, supra note 108, at 136.
177 JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 367 (quoting James Monroe); see also HOWARD M. SACHAR, A
HISTORY OF THEJEWS IN AMERICA 45-46 (1992) (discussing the dismissal of Noah).
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(according to the New Testament). 7 " Given such religious views,
many Americans feared that Mormonism threatened the predomi-
nant forms of Protestantism, as well as republican democracy.'7 9 Per-
secution of the Mormons, unsurprisingly, was common and often vio-
lent, forcing Smith's followers to move from state to state as they
sought refuge. From New York, Smith went to Ohio, where he was
eventually dragged from his house to be tarred and feathered. Smith
moved on to Jackson County, Missouri, where mob violence again
forced him to flee, this time to northern Missouri. Further violence
led the Mormons next to Illinois, where Smith was arrested, then in
June 1844, murdered while he was awaiting trial. 80  Finally, Smith's
successor, Brigham Young, led the community to the Great Salt Lake
area, where they established the autonomous State of Deseret, only to
become embroiled with the federal government in legal struggles
that would stretch on for decades.1
8'
The force of politics on the conceptions of free expression and re-
ligious freedom changed with the transition from republican to plu-
ralist democracy. The republican democratic principles of civic vir-
tue and the common good had long facilitated the exclusion of
various societal groups from fully participating in the American pol-
ity. Groups, such as immigrant laborers, were either excluded or dis-
couraged from participating, supposedly because they lacked the vir-
tue necessary to understand or contribute to the common good-a
concept that typically embodied the interests and values of old-stock
Americans, particularly Protestant elites. 82  Given this exclusionary
aspect of republican democracy, the denial or suppression of specific
178 AHLSTROM, supra note 20, at 502 (quoting Fawn Brodie as stating, "Joseph's was no mere
dissenting sect. It was a real religious creation, one intended to be to Christianity what Christi-
anity was to Judaism: that is, a reform and a consummation"); BUTLER, supra note 20, at 242
(noting how Smith's book metamorphosed Mormonism into that which "made possible the re-
covery of ancient spiritual truth that had been hobbled by the corruptions of time and imper-
fect Christian practice"); see also HATCH, supra note 20, at 114-16 (arguing that Smith's book
attacked social injustices biblically, rather than politically).
179 AHLSTROM, supra note 20, at 557.
1s0 Id. at 505-06.
181 Id. at 506-07; see also MAZUR, supra note 53, at 69-89.
2 do not mean to suggest that Protestant elites always consciously sought to link the com-
mon good to their own interests and values. To the contrary, these elites might have sincerely
believed that they had correctly specified the common good, but of course, their perceptions of
the common good were tacitly shaped by their own interests and values. In other words, the
common good might correspond with the Protestant elites' interests and values regardless of
whether the elites consciously sought this correspondence. For an example of this type of phe-
nomenon, see LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 159-60 (Harvard Uni-
versity Press 1999) (illustrating a 1904 adoption dispute in a small Arizona mining town, where
the white citizens genuinely believed that they acted for the common good when they pre-
vented Mexican-American families from adopting white children (Irish Catholic New Yorkers)).
Yet, these citizens clearly acted in a manner conducive to their own interests and values; many
of the citizen-protest leaders eventually adopted the children themselves.
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individual rights, such as religious freedom, was often only part of a
societal group's more comprehensive political subjugation. The
courts, from this perspective, merely reinforced the exclusionary ten-
dencies of republican democracy. But the transition from republican
to pluralist democracy undermined the traditional justifications for
oppressing societal outsiders or, to use Ran Hirschl's term, "'periph-
eral' groups.' '8 3 After all, the crux of pluralist democracy was partici-
pation: all groups and individuals, in theory, were to participate, to
express their interests and values in the democratic marketplace.
One did not need to demonstrate democratic worthiness by endors-
ing Protestant-tinged conceptions of virtue and the common good.
One reason, of course, for the emergence of pluralist democracy
was the actual expanding political power within the American polity
of outsider, or, peripheral groups, such as Irish Catholics, Eastern
European Jews, and laborers in general-a burgeoning power that
undergirded the New Deal. The flowering of this outsider political
power, within the framework of the pluralist democratic regime, fur-
ther threatened the status and power of old-stock Americans. The
Protestant old-stock elite, in fact, were forced to retreat from their
former hegemonic position-that retreat was part of the transition to
pluralist democracy-but they refused to surrender either willingly or
completely to the outsiders. Rather, they sought, in a sense, to re-
trench; forced to retreat, they searched for positions where they
could fortify and thus protect their dominant (though no longer
hegemonic) interests and values. One such position of fortification
was in the courts.
8 4
During the 1930s, the Protestant old-stock elite turned to the judi-
cial enforcement of constitutional rights as a potential bulwark
against the majoritarian threat posed by the (pluralist) democratic
empowerment of peripheral groups. In other words, old-stock
Americans sought "the constitutionalization of rights"-the designa-
tion of their own interests and values as constitutional rights enforce-
able through the courts.' 85 When their interests and values were con-
stitutionalized as judicially-sanctioned rights, they were effectively
protected from the vagaries of the democratic processes--democratic
processes that now included peripheral groups and that therefore
183 Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Les-
sons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 95 (2000) [hereinafter
Hirschl, Political Origins]; Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards:
Judicial Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 415, 432 (2000) [here-
inafter Hirschl, Looking].
184 See generally, KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing that liberal
reforms simultaneously transformed and legitimated racist social structures).
185 Hirschl, Political Origins, supra note 183, at 96.
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dangerously encompassed the interests and values of those previously
excluded outsiders. s6 To be sure, during the Progressive and early
New Deal eras, old-stock elites had sought to protect their economic
interests through judicial review, an effort that produced some of the
famous Lochner-era decisions, such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
holding that a minimum wage law violated liberty of contract."' But
even when the old-stock elites were forced to retreat in 1937-when
economic regulation became subject to mere rational basis re-
view 1 8-they still sought to protect their interests and values through
the judicial enforcement of other rights and liberties, including free
expression and religious freedom. This strategy contributed to the
judicial invigoration of First Amendment freedoms.
It was not coincidental, then, that in the 1940s the Protestant-
controlled Supreme Court incorporated the religion clauses to apply
against state and local governments through the Due Process
Clause.189 By this time, American Catholics constituted the largest
18 Hirschl writes:
[T]he process of judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights may
accelerate when the hegemony of ruling elites in majoitarian decision-making arenas is
threatened by "peripheral" groups. As such threats become severe, hegemonic elites
who possess disproportionate access to and influence upon the legal arena may initiate a
constitutional entrenchment of rights in order to transfer power to the courts. This
process of conscious judicial empowerment in relatively open, rule-of-law polities is likely
to occur when thejudiciary's public reputation for political impartiality and rectitude is
relatively high and when the courts are likely to rule, by and large, in accordance with
the cultural propensities of the hegemonic community. In other words, judicial empow-
erment through the constitutional fortification of rights may provide an efficient institu-
tional way for hegemonic sociopolitical forces to preserve their hegemony and to secure
their policy preferences even when majoritarian decision-making processes are not oper-
ating to their advantage.
Id. at 95.
187 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Other examples include the following: United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down a federal tax on farm processors); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down a federal law regulating the poultry industry, includ-
ing its wages and hours); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal law
regulating child factory labor); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915) (striking down a Kansas
law barring "yellow dog contracts" as a violation of the "freedom of contract"); and Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law barring bakers from working more
than sixty hours per week).
188 See, e.g., NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937) (allowing regula-
tion of unfair labor practices if the actions affected interstate commerce); W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital).
8 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-07 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause). For more on the religious makeup of the Supreme Court, see Stephen M. Feldman,
Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 222, 232 n.41 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman, Religious Minorities] (discussing the Jus-
tices' religious affiliations). Helpful sources on Protestant-Catholic relations and their implica-
tions for the Supreme Court's religion-clause decisions include the following: Thomas C. Berg,
Anti-Catholicism and Modem Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); John C.
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Christian group in the nation; the total number of Protestants still far
outnumbered Catholics, but Catholics nonetheless outnumbered the
largest Protestant denomination. ' 90 A judicially invigorated Estab-
lishment Clause-now applicable against state and local govern-
ments-provided Protestant refuge from the potential reach of
Catholic political power within the pluralist democratic regime. For
example, in cases challenging governmental aid to nonpublic (pre-
dominantly Catholic) schools, the Supreme Court invalidated the
governmental action nearly twice as often as it upheld the action.' 9'
Wherever Catholic and Protestant interests and values diverged, the
religion clauses offered a judicially enforceable mechanism that Prot-
estants could invoke to prevent or retard the imposition of Catholic
views through democratic processes.1
9 2
But not all constitutional rights are created equal. The Supreme
CourtJustices did not (and do not) treat all claims for the protection
of individual rights similarly. In fact, the Court favored free expres-
sion over religious freedom claims partly because of the status of the
claimants vis-A-vis the Justices and the Protestant mainstream. Signifi-
cantly, while many claimants in First Amendment cases from the
1930s and 1940s were outsiders, the salience of such claimants as out-
siders varied with the particular context of each case. '93  In other
Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279
(2001).
190 See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 189, at 226-27 (stating that a third of church-
going Americans were Catholic, and noting that the number of Catholics was double the num-
ber of Baptists, the next largest group). In fact, the Roman Catholic Church had already be-
come "America's largest Christian church by mid-nineteenth century," and it continued its
growth into the twentieth century. ROBERT T. HANDY, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCHES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 312 (1976).
191 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1530-49 (5th ed. 2005) (providing
an overview of cases pertaining to facially neutral statutes that affected religion); Jeffries &
Ryan, supra note 189, at 288 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's determination "to inhibit aid to
parochial schools"). Jeffries and Ryan write:
[A] ban against aid to religious schools was supported by the great bulk of the Protestant
faithful. With few exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and believers vigor-
ously opposed aid to religious schools. For many Protestant denominations, this position
followed naturally from the circumstances of their founding. It was strongly reinforced,
however, by hostility to Roman Catholics and the challenge they posed to the Protestant
hegemony, which prevailed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In
its political origins and constituencies, the ban against aid to religious schools aimed not
only to prevent an establishment of religion but also to maintain one.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 189, at 282.
192 See Berg, supra note 189, at 123-51 (discussing an increase in separationism from the late
1940s to the early 1960s); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 189, at 312-27 (describing efforts to pre-
vent aid to religious schools and secularization of public schools).
193 See LICHTMAN, supra note 28, at 73-76 (stressing how the salience of prejudice against dif-
ferent groups of outsiders can vary over time depending on a variety of conditions). Helpful
social science resources on ingroup-outgroup relations and prejudices include: Marilynn B.
Brewer, The Social Self. On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 475, 475 (1991) [hereinafter Brewer, The Social Sell]; Marilynn B. Brewer &
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words, the degree of insider or old-stock prejudice against peripheral
groups was not a constant-it fluctuated with the circumstances.
Most important, then, the salience of a claimant as an outsider
tended to be more intense in religious freedom (and especially free
exercise) than in free expression cases.
Social science research demonstrates that ingroup-outgroup dif-
ferentiation tends to define an individual's social identity. Accord-
ingly, one's membership in significant social groups or categories
largely determines one's personal identity, values, and perceptions.19
Individuals "tend to perceive themselves as having similar or identical
goals to members of their own group and different or opposed goals
to members of other groups."' 9 Even an individual's perception of
Sherry K. Schneider, Social Identity and Social Dilemmas: A Double-edged Sword, in SOCIAL IDENTITY
THEORY 169, 183-84 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990) [hereinafter Brewer &
Schneider, Social Identity]; Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Re-
categorization, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 239, 245-47 (1989); Norman Miller &
Marilynn B. Brewer, Categorization Effects on Ingroup and Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 209, 209-30 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986)
[hereinafter Miller & Brewer, Categorization]; James Sidanius, The Psychology of Group Conflict and
the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social Dominance Perspective, in EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 183, 183 (Shanto Iyengar & William J. McGuire eds., 1993); Henri Tajfel &John C.
Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 7, 7 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Tajfel &
Turner, The Social Identity Theory]; Wolfgang T6nnesmann, Group Identification and Political So-
cialisation, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM 175, 189 (Vernon Reynolds et al. eds.,
1986); John C. Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behaviour, in INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR 66, 66 (John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981) [hereinafter Turner, The Experi-
mental Social Psychology]; Johan M.G. van der Dennen, Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group
Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF
ETHNOCENTRISM, supra, at 1, 1-2.
194 Tajfel & Turner, The Social Identity Theory, supra note 193, at 7-24; see also Miller & Brewer,
Categorization, supra note 193, at 213 ("[I]ngroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are seen as
consequences of the unit formation between self and other ingroup members and the linking
of one's identity to them."); T6nnesmann, supra note 193, at 184 ("[Plsychological group
membership is first of all a perceptual and cognitive affair, and... an emotional involvement
with the group may follow as a consequence of the perceived group membership.").
For discussions of the problems of identifying group membership, see Gary R. Johnson et
al., The Evocative Signficance of Kin Terms in Patriotic Speech, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF
ETHNOCENTRISM supra note 193, at 157, 157-59 (proposing the idea that patriotic language can
evoke altruistic behavior because large-scale human relationships mimic familial associations);
Umberto Melotti, In-group/Out-group Relations and the Issue of Group Selection, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM, supra note 193, at 94, 105-11 (recounting the controversy
over group selection). Law can contribute to the development of group consciousness. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 419, 451-53 (2001) (describing how legal decisions influenced social reform movements).
195 Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology, supra note 193, at 97. Membership in a cultural
group can shape an individual's most basic emotional reactions. See Hazel Rose Markus & Shi-
nobu Kitayama, The Cultural Construction of Self and Emotion: Implications for Social Behavior, in
EMOTION AND CULTURE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE 89, 89-91 (Shinobu Kita-
yama & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994) (using the example of Masako Owada's marriage to
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self-interest varies with the salience of intergroup divisions. 96
"[P]eople favor in-group members in the allocation [of] rewards, in
their personal regard, and in the evaluation of the products of their
labor."'197  Unsurprisingly, then, individuals tend to discriminate
against outgroup members-even when no tangible benefit will be
realized.9 8  Empirical evidence shows that "an individual will dis-
criminate against a member of an out-group even when there is no
conflict of interest and there is no past history of intergroup hostil-
ity. ' "9 But when tangible conflicts arise between ingroup and out-
group members, or when the outgroup's actions frustrate the in-
group, two important consequences follow. First, the conflict is likely
to enhance the cohesion or solidarity among the ingroup members
(as well as the cohesion among the outgroup members). Second,
the conflict is likely to increase the salience of the division between
the groups. As a consequence, ingroup prejudice against the out-
group is likely to intensify. "When and which group memberships
become salient for the individual depend on situational factors," ex-
Crown Prince Naruhito to illustrate the differences between Japanese and American under-
standing of self).
'9' "[T]he self-concept is expandable and contractable across different levels of social identity
with associated transformations in the definition of self and the basis for self-evaluation. When
the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also
changes accordingly." Brewer, The Social Self supra note 193, at 476. Accord Brewer & Schnei-
der, Social Identity, supra note 193, at 170 (making the same point).
Even basic cognitive processes are shaped by cultural memberships. See Richard E. Nisbett et
a]., Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 291, 291-
92 (2001) (comparing the cognitive processes of individuals reared in cultures influenced by
ancient China and Greece); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self. Impli-
cations for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 224, 224-25, 231-35 (1991) (re-
searching the different cognitive construals of the self in Japanese and American cultures).
197 Gaertner et al., supra note 193, at 239 (citations omitted).
198 See T6nnesmann, supra note 193, at 183-84 (citing research that shows members discrimi-
nate against outgroup members, even if the categories were based on trivial criterion and the
members did not personally benefit); see also Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology, supra
note 193, at 100 ("Not objective interests but social identity may be the most predictive social
psychological variable for understanding the development and resolution of intergroup con-
flict."); van der Dennen, supra note 193, at 17 ("[M]ere categorisation is sufficient to produce
intergroup discrimination.") (citations omitted).
199 van der Dennen, supra note 193, at 17. James Sidanius, who elaborates social identity the-
ory into a social dominance theory, emphasizes that "prejudice and discrimination" are not
"pathological or quasi-pathological conditions," but rather represent the normal or "default
conditions" of political societies. Sidanius, supra note 193, at 215.
200 See van der Dennen, supra note 193, at 30 (demonstrating "that conflict between two
groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity within the groups").
201 T6nnesmann, supra note 193, at 184; see also van der Dennen, supra note 193, at 17 ("[I]t
is the awareness of the existence of categories which generates the in-group response .... .") (em-
phasis added).
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plains Wolfgang Tonnesmann.20 2 "[O]ne could almost say that they
are 'switched on' in particular situations (like going into a ballot
booth or watching a football match between two national teams), and
then determine how the situation is experienced by an individual and
how he reacts to the people around him."2 2
Apparently, then, one reason the Court favored free expression
over religious freedom is that religion-clause claims were more likely
to "switch on" the Justices' ingroup (Protestant, old-stock, elite)
prejudices against outsider (peripheral, outgroup) claimants. °4 Many
of the free expression and religious freedom cases from the 1930s
and 1940s involved claimants from peripheral groups. Indeed, as the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases reveal, the same claimant often invoked
both free expression and religious freedom. But the respective
claims were qualitatively different. When an outsider invoked the
free expression component of the First Amendment, he or she was
likely to describe free expression as a principle that applies equally to
all. The outsider, from this perspective, did not seek any special
treatment; rather, he or she sought to be treated the same as other
citizens. But when that same outsider invoked religious freedom-
particularly the free exercise component of the First Amendment-
the claim amounted to a request for special treatment because of reli-
gious differences from the mainstream.
Most free exercise claimants request a judicial exemption from a
generally applicable law. In such a situation, the government has
adopted a general law as opposed to one specifically focused on relig-
ion. Nonetheless, this general law interferes with the practices or be-
liefs of members of a minority religion. For instance, in Goldman v.
Weinberger,206 the Air Force had adopted a regulation prohibiting the
wearing of a hat or other head covering in certain circumstances. Re-
ligious convictions, however, mandate that Orthodox Jews always
keep their heads covered (by wearing, for example, a yarmulke).
20 T6nnesmann, supra note 193, at 184. It should be noted that an individual can identify
with several different groups, any one of which might become more salient at a particular time.
See id. at 183 (illustrating this principle with group membership based on politics).
203 Id. at 184 (citations omitted).
See id. (discussing how the salience of group membership is "switched on" in accordance
with various situations); cf Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1497, 1499-1501 (2003) (discussing how xenophobic prejudices influence jury decision mak-
ing).
205 In other words, religious insiders (mainstream Christians) would view free exercise claims
as requests for special treatment precisely because the outsider-claimant's religion differed from
mainstream Christianity's normative content. I thank Lew Schlosser for underscoring this
point. Cf Lewis Z. Schlosser, Christian Privilege: Breaking a Sacred Taboo, 31 J. MULTICULTURAL
COUNSELING & DEv. 44, 45-49 (2003) (emphasizing how American society propagates Christian
privilege vis-A-vis non-Christian religions).
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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Goldman, an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer, thus sought a free
exercise exemption so that he could follow his religious convictions
while remaining in the Air Force. °7 The crux of such a free exercise
exemption claim is difference from the mainstream. Goldman would
not have sought a free exercise exemption but for the fact that Or-
thodox Jews, unlike most Christians, are compelled to wear head cov-
erings. Indeed, members of mainstream religions will rarely seek a
free exercise exemption because generally applicable laws infre-
quently conflict with their practices or beliefs. ° The law makers ei-
ther belong to (or are fully aware of) the mainstream religions and
are thus unlikely to adopt laws that interfere with such mainstream
practices and beliefs. But when the religious outsider seeks a free ex-
ercise exemption, she does so precisely because of the differences be-
tween her religion and the mainstream.
In other words, the free exercise claimant (the outsider) necessar-
ily places herself in conflict with the mainstream as manifested by the
generally applicable law. Moreover, the claimant's stance can poten-
tially frustrate the (mainstream) purposes behind the general law.
This type of conflict and frustration is a burr likely to prickle the sali-
ence of the Supreme Court Justices' ingroup-outgroup sensibilities.
Consequently, in the 1930s and 1940s, when theJustices confronted a
free exercise claimant, they would have been likely to experience an
intensified sense of solidarity with the other Justices as Protestant in-
siders, even if they normally were not overly devout. Concomitantly,
the Justices would have perceived an increased salience of separate-
ness from the claimant (since the claimant's status as an outsider
would be more distinct), and the Justices therefore would have been
more likely to be prejudiced against the claimant and her constitu-
tional position. These same phenomena, moreover, could arise in
Establishment-Clause cases, especially if the claim was framed in a
manner highlighting religious divergence.0 9
Whether we care to admit it or not, religious differences can, in
certain contexts, generate salient divisions among Americans-even
207 The Court rejected Goldman's claim. The majority misleadingly referred to his desire to
wear a yarmulke as a personal preference. Id. at 508.
208 Empirical studies show that members of mainstream religions are less likely to bring free
exercise claims. SeeJames C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 248 (1999) (noting that Christians are less likely to bring claims
because of the majoritarian political process); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul ofJudi-
cial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 563,
577 (2004) (comparing the 37.3% of mainline Protestant judges in the religion cases with the
only 1.7% of claimants in the cases). I thank Greg Sisk for underscoring this point for me.
2W See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 189, at 259-61 (describing how religious di-
vergence could generate indifference or hostility from the Court, even in Establishment Clause
cases).
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between Supreme Court Justices and litigants. Such divisions, more-
over, either directly shape the Justices' reactions to religious freedom
cases or otherwise influence the Justices' political stances, which in
turn influence the Justices' applications of legal doctrines. 20 But, as a
general matter, how salient were religious divisions in American soci-
ety-particularly for the 1930s and 1940s? Evidence suggests an un-
ambiguous answer: under the right (or, one might say, wrong) con-
ditions, religious divisions predominated over other concerns. In an
empirical study of the 1928 presidential election, Allan J. Lichtman
identified a number of "antagonisms that allegedly sundered the na-
tion into two Americas during the 1920s: Catholics versus Protes-
tants, wets versus drys, immigrants versus natives, and city versus
country. ". A contemporary campaign publication unabashedly high-
lighted these divisions:
If you believe in Anglo-Saxon Protestant domination; if you believe in
those principles which have made the country what it is; if you believe in
prohibition, its observance and enforcement, and if you believe in a fur-
ther restricted immigration rather than letting down the bars still lower,
then whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, you will vote for Hoo-
212
ver....
The 1928 election, of course, merits special historical import, be-
cause it was the first time one of the major political parties had
nominated a Catholic, Al Smith, and Lichtman's study concludes that
religion as embodied in the Protestant-Catholic divide overrode all
other antagonisms.1 3 Lichtman is careful to underscore that the sali-
ence of Protestant anti-Catholicism varies with context.2 14 In 1928,
Lichtman reasons, anti-Catholicism intensified precisely because a
Catholic ran for president. After 1928, anti-Catholicism persisted, but
it receded to its more normal level.21  Given this normal degree of
Protestant prejudice against Catholics, the salience of anti-
Catholicism could always intensify under the proper conditions. And
the proper conditions would arise, as I have explained, in judicial
cases involving religious freedom. The Justices would occasionally,
behind closed doors, reveal their religious prejudices. For example,
Justice William 0. Douglas passed a note to Justice Hugo Black dur-
210 See generally Feldman, The Rule of Law, supra note 5 (explaining how the Justices' political
preferences influence their interpretations of legal materials).
LICHTMAN, supra note 28, at 25.
212 HANDY, supra note 152, at 176 (quoting an Anti-Saloon League publication).
213 "Religion was undoubtedly the most sensitive emotional issue of 1928." LICHTMAN, supra
note 28, at 40.
214 Id. at 73-76, 121. "Religion, more than any other attribute of voters, made the coalitions
supporting Smith and Hoover different from those that coalesced behind candidates in earlier
or in later years." Id. at 25.
215 Lichtman writes that "anti-Catholicism lost its immediate salience." Id. at 74.
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ing an oral argument complaining that "[i]f the Catholics get public
money to finance their religious schools, we better insist on getting
some good prayers in public schools or we Protestants are out of busi-
ness." 6 Indeed, a recent empirical study of religious freedom cases
in the lower federal courts from 1986 through 1995 concludes that
"the single most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judi-
cial decision making was religion-religion in terms of affiliation of
the claimant, the background of the judge, and the demographics of
the community."
21
One reason, then, that the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court
favored free expression over religious freedom during the 1930s and
1940s was that the religious freedom claims were more likely than the
free expression claims to intensify the salience of the Justices' separa-
tion from the claimants as outsiders. In the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases, when a claimant invoked free expression, the Justices could
readily perceive the value of a broad principle of free expression for
Protestant elites, as well as for members of peripheral groups. In-
deed, for Protestant elites, the development of a broad principle of
free expression might be especially worthwhile, given the threat of
outsider political power in the emergent pluralist, democratic re-
gime. But when Jehovah's Witnesses invoked religious freedom, their
own focus on religion was likely to provoke the Justices' religious
prejudices against the claimants as outsiders.18 Putting this in differ-
ent terms, a religious freedom claim was, most often, integrally tied to
a Jehovah's Witness's status as an outsider-a member of a discrete
216 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 401 n.26 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (discussing Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). For discussions of additional anti-Catholic statements by
various Supreme Court Justices, see Berg, supra note 189, at 129 (mentioning evidence of mul-
tiple Justices' support for anti-Catholicism). See alsoJohn T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own:
Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97, 122-26 (1997)
(detailing various suspicions about Catholics held by multiple Justices). It is worth noting that
the appointments of New Deal Justices like Douglas and Black, members of the Protestant elite,
were due in part to Catholic political support for the New Deal. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note
24, at 184-85 (linking Catholics and FDR). This irony suggests that while certain Protestants
and Catholics might have a congruence of interests in some circumstances, the Protestants'
anti-Catholicism can become more salient in other contexts. I thank Mark Tushnet for bring-
ing this point to my attention.
217 Sisk et al., supra note 208, at 614.
218 "[T]he salience of relevant categorizations is also an important factor" in determining
"intergroup bias." Gaertner et al., supra note 193, at 246. It is worth noting that in many of
these cases, a decision based on religious freedom could be construed more narrowly than one
based on free expression. That is, the granting of a free exercise exemption would not sweep as
broadly as the articulation of a principle of free expression, yet the Justices would nonetheless
rely on the broader ground of decision. Such reliance on a broader, rather than narrower
ground runs contrary to the usual rules ofjudicial decision making, suggesting that the Justices
sought to resolve these cases in ways that favored the mainstream (rather than the outsiders). I
thank Alan Chen for raising this point.
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and insular (religious) minority."9 With a free expression claim, the
claimant was still an outsider, a Jehovah's Witness, but the crux of the
claim rarely was that status, as an outsider qua outsider. Conse-
quently, Jehovah's Witnesses were more likely to emerge victorious
when they stressed, and the justices focused on, free expression
rather than religious freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court confronted and
contributed to a transition from republican to pluralist democracy.
The hallmark of republican democracy had been the virtuous pursuit
of the common good. Governmental actions for partial or private in-
terests were impermissible. Under pluralist democracy, though, the
republican democratic principles, virtue and the common good, were
supplanted; from the pluralist democratic standpoint, they had been
a facade for Protestant old-stock interests and values and, as such, had
been used to impede or prevent the participation of peripheral
groups in the American polity. Under pluralist democracy, all indi-
viduals and groups supposedly were to participate, to express their in-
terests and values through democratic institutions. Politics were
about building coalitions, jostling for advantages, compromising
when necessary, and generally seeking to maximize the satisfaction of
one's interests.
As the Court encountered the emerging pluralist democratic re-
gime in the 1930s and 1940s, both constitutional theory and constitu-
tional politics contributed to the development of individual rights
and liberties. On the one hand, First Amendment freedoms in gen-
eral were invigorated, but on the other hand, the Justices favored free
expression over religious freedom. The developing theory of plural-
ist democracy readily justified an expansive concept of free expres-
sion. An individual could not be a full and equal democratic partici-
pant unless she could freely gather information about political issues
and unrestrainedly express her interests and values in the democratic
arena. Yet, the theoretical relationship between pluralist democracy
219 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition... [and] may call for a corre-
spondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry.").
M Religious freedom encompasses both free exercise and anti-establishment claims. Free
exercise claims almost always accentuate the religious differences of the claimant, while Estab-
lishment Clause claims can accentuate differences to a greater or lesser extent, partly depend-
ing on how the claim is framed. My analysis suggests that an Establishment Clause claim has a
better chance for success if the claimant underscores his or her religious similarities, rather
than differences, to the mainstream. See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 189, at 238-61
(discussing different strategies ofJewish organizations in Supreme Court briefs).
[Vol. 8:3
May 2006] THEORY AND POLITICS OFFIRSTAMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 475
and religious freedom seemed more ambiguous. While numerous
theories could be offered to justify the protection of religious free-
dom, no single theory enjoyed widespread support. Partly for this
reason, the Justices imbued free expression rather than religious
freedom with the greater vitality.
Constitutional politics further contributed to this preference for
expression over religion. As the pluralist democratic regime solidi-
fied, the Protestant old-stock elite, aided by the Protestant-controlled
Supreme Court, constitutionalized their interests and values, particu-
larly in First Amendment freedoms. This formed a bulwark against
the emergent political power of peripheral groups. But through this
constitutionalization of rights, the Justices differentiated free expres-
sion and religious freedom. When a case highlighted the outsider-
claimant's difference from the mainstream-as would happen often
in religious freedom cases-the Justices were less likely to uphold the
constitutional claim.
Meanwhile, in those cases where the Court upheld the First
Amendment claim, the Justices were most likely to view the claimants'
practices as similar to mainstream practices and interests. For exam-
ple, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court invalidated an ordinance
proscribing door-to-door distributions of written materials, as applied
to a Jehovah's Witness.2 Focusing on free expression, Justice Black's
majority opinion emphasized how the Witnesses' method, the door-
to-door distribution of literature, resonated with mainstream prac-
tices:
The widespread use of this method of communication by many groups
espousing various causes attests its major importance.... Many of our
most widely established religious organizations have used this method of
disseminating their doctrines, and laboring groups have used it in re-
cruiting their members. The federal government, in its current war bond
selling campaign, encourages groups of citizens to distribute advertise-
ments and circulars from house to house.... [A]s every person ac-
quainted with political life knows, door to door campaigninVis one of
the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support ....
If the Court was occasionally to find the actions of a peripheral group
to be protected under the First Amendment, these types of actions-
fitting so harmoniously with the interests, values, and practices of the
mainstream-were ideal. 3
221 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
222 Id. at 145-46.
22 In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court struck down a license fee as applied to Jehovah's
Witnesses who were distributing written materials door-to-door. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
Justice Douglas's majority opinion linked free expression and religious freedom, and in doing
so, he accentuated how the Witnesses' practices harmonized with mainstream traditions. As
Justice Douglas explained:
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Finally, while the Court's treatment of free expression and reli-
gious freedom claims over the last half-century has been anything but
consistent, the Court today clearly favors free expression over reli-
gious freedom.2 4 In Employment Division v. Smith, decided in 1990, the
Court considered the appropriate test for free exercise challenges to
laws of general applicability. ' The Court expressly rejected the strict
scrutiny test, which required the government to show that its action
was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.26 In-
stead, the Court held that "the political process" should effectively
determine the scope of free exercise rights.
2 27
The Court, however, articulated three exceptions for when strict
scrutiny would be appropriate: first, if the government intentionally
228discriminates against religion; second, if the case involves the denial
of unemployment compensation; 229 and third, if the case involves a
"hybrid" claim, where free exercise is combined with some other con-
stitutional right.2 0 "The only decisions," the Court wrote in explain-
ing the hybrid-claims exception, "in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
[W]e do not intimate or suggest in respecting [the Witnesses'] sincerity that any conduct
can be made a religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First
Amendment.... We only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the
Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an
age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more or-
thodox types.
Id. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
The Justices, moreover, seemed especially apt to uphold free expression claims when the
disputed speech or writing attacked a peripheral group. For example, in Near v. Minnesota, only
the second clear free speech victory, the Court found the disputed writings, which were laced
with anti-semitic diatribes, to be protected. 283 U.S. 697, 721-23 (1931). Similarly, in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, the Court found speech attacking the Catholic religion to be protected. 310 U.S.
296, 310-11 (1940).
24 See Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free
Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 372 (2004) ("[C]urrent First
Amendment doctrines encourage litigants to classify every type of religious activity as speech, in
the hope of obtaining a higher scrutiny of governmental activity."); Mark Tushnet, The Redun-
dant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 72 (2001) ("The free speech doctrine includes
a non-discrimination requirement, which the Supreme Court has invoked with respect to reli-
gious speech.").
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
226 Id. at 885.
227 Id. at 890.
228 Id. at 877-78; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating an animal cruelty law that had been interpreted to punish killings for
religious reasons).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-
35 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who
refused to work on Sundays, but did not belong to established church or sect).
23 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT.
REV. 1, 41 (discussing the Smith exceptions).
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Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press."2 1' Because the first two exceptions are triggered only rarely,
the hybrid-claims exception now appears to be the primary means for
invoking heightened judicial scrutiny.
Thus, the current Court, as a general matter, rigorously protects
free expression, typically presuming that speech is protected unless it
falls into a category of low-value expression. However, except when a
free exercise claim can be conjoined with another constitutional
claim, particularly free expression, religious freedom will most often
be subject to the whims of the political process.232 Free exercise, as so
interpreted, is a second-class constitutional right. Standing alone, it
is unlikely to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny; in most instances,
courts will merely defer to legislative judgments. Predictably, subse-
quent to Smith, cases involving religion have often been construed to
raise free expression issues, thus better justifying heightened scru-
tiny.
233
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the theoretical uncertainties sur-
rounding religious freedom under pluralist democracy, the Smith
Court justified its holding by underscoring problems inherent to a
legal order under a pluralist democratic regime.3 4 The Court ex-
plained that:
231 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
232 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court also downgraded the level of scrutiny to be applied
in most Establishment Clause cases. 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also Feldman, Religious Minorities,
supra note 189, at 263, 261-65 (discussing the consolidation of previous Establishment Clause
tests, and using only "the purpose and effects prongs" of the three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
2 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (using free speech
"public forum" analysis); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) (holding
that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible under First Amendment public forum stan-
dards); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 n.4 (1993)
(declining to address the merits of the Establishment Clause claim because of reversal on First
Amendment grounds). A similar pre-Smith case is Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981),
in which the Court applied a public forum analysis, declining to use an Establishment Clause
test. See Garry, supra note 224, at 385-88 (discussing cases favoring free expression over reli-
gious freedom).
An empirical study concluded that, after Smith, lawyers shifted their strategies to emphasize
the expressive components of religious freedom claims. "Before Smith, free speech arguments
were raised in only 12.9% of the cases we studied that involved claims for religious accommoda-
tion, while the proportion of cases framed as involving expressive rights more than doubled to
28.7% after Smith." Sisk et al., supra note 208, at 570.
234 I do not mean to suggest that the reasons for the Court favoring free expression over reli-
gious freedom are the same today as in the 1930s and 1940s. To be sure, there are overlaps, but
there are also differences. For instance, the Court today is more religiously diverse than it has
ever before been, yet the evidence suggests that nowadays the degree of religiosity of a Justice
often matters more than his or her religious affiliation. A conservative Protestant Justice, con-
sequently, is more likely to have views consonant with a conservative Catholic Justice than with a
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Any society adopting [a strict scrutiny test to determine the constitution-
ality of a general law] would be courting anarchy, but that danger in-
creases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious be-
liefs .... Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of
people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious ob-
jector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of
the highest order.
In other words, exactly because pluralist democracy rests on the
inclusion of diverse societal groups within the American polity, the
right to religious freedom must be narrowed. Otherwise, the Court
reasoned, government would be hamstrung; nearly every general law
would interfere with the practices or beliefs of some obscure religious
group-or so the Court suggested. Of course, as even the Smith
Court acknowledged, this approach to religious freedom favors the
mainstream-a familiar result from the vantage of constitutional poli-
tics. "[L] eaving accommodation to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in," the Court explained plaintively, "but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred."
2 36
liberal Protestant Justice. Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 189, at 272-73; Sisk et al.,
supra note 208, at 579-81.
25 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (citations omitted).
2M36 Id. at 890. One thing that did not change during the transition from republican to plural-
ist democracy was that the predominant understanding of religious freedom favored the reli-
gious mainstream. Yet, the nature of religious freedom, including its relation to free expres-
sion, otherwise changed in many ways and for many reasons, including the increased religious
diversity of the nation and the increased number of religious freedom cases to reach the Su-
preme Court during the twentieth century.
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